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1.1 Background and motivation for the study 
This study focuses on illiquidity of securities and its effects on company valuation. The 
recent financial crisis and the recession in 1990 showed how important liquidity is and 
how quickly the markets can tank in the case of materialized liquidity risk (Longstaff 
1995). In addition, many shareholders have suffered great losses when the markets are in 
downturn and at the same time there is liquidity restrictions which forbid selling shares 
(Kahl, Liu & Longstaff 2003).  
A basic method in finance is to value investments by discounting future cash flows 
with a risk-adjusted discount factor and the resulting value should be the same regardless 
of the firm. This method is based on an assumption that there are unlimited investor cli-
enteles. (Loderer & Roth 2005.) The price implied from that theory needs unrestrained 
trading between investors and the arbitrage guarantees that the price reflects the intrinsic 
value. (Loderer & Roth 2005; Shleifer & Vishny 1997.) However, limited liquidity ex-
poses markets mispricing and due to this, investors may be reluctant to trade (Loderer & 
Roth 2005). Therefore, the pricing should be adjusted with some risk factor or a liquidity 
discount multiple. 
The liquidity cost comes from the fact that less liquid financial assets have higher ex-
ecution costs to investors and therefore investors are not willing to pay as much as they 
would from pure liquid assets which are easy to sell quickly and with a reasonable price 
level. This refers to limited liquidity. (Amihud & Mendelson 2012.) Higher transaction 
costs i.e. lower liquidity increases uncertainty of investors due to limited liquidity and 
therefore investors demand a higher discount for the lack of marketability (Chen, Dyl, 
Jiang & Juneja. 2015). The liquidity cost is based on two main components: direct trading 
costs and price-impact costs. First, direct trading costs include commissions for broker-
ages, exchange fees and taxes which materialized due to the transaction. Second, the 
price-impact cost is the price effect when selling or buying an asset. The price-impact 
cost is a premium when you are buying an asset and a discount when selling an illiquid 
asset. There is a great probability that the price-impact cost is much higher than the direct 
trading cost due to illiquidity of a security. (Amihud & Mendelson 2012.)  
In general, investors are happy to pay for liquidity. While the illiquidity premium is 
widely approved, there is still strong debate on how to estimate limited liquidity and in-
clude it into value. (Damodaran, 2005.) A well-known way to estimate illiquidity is to 
measure the cost of immediate execution. When an investor wants to sell the asset imme-
diately there is a risk that he/she might get a relatively low price and other investors can 
take advantage of this i.e. low market liquidity. This can be seen as a tradeoff between 
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time and money. The bid price refers to the first case where the price has a discount due 
to the immediate selling and the quoted ask price refers to the second case which includes 
a premium compared to immediate buying. The bid price and the quoted ask price are 
reflected in the markets and the spread between the bid and ask price can be seen as a 
measure of illiquidity of a financial asset. (Amihud & Mendelson 1986, Loderer & Roth 
2005.)  
Damodaran (2005) suggests that there are three ways to incorporate the illiquidity ef-
fect on company valuation. First, calculate the value of a liquid asset and then use an 
illiquidity discount which is regressed from the actual market data (see also Loderer & 
Roth 2005). Second, calculate the cost of capital for the share and then take into account 
the asset specific illiquidity and sum the illiquidity premium to the calculated cost of 
capital. This method seems to be the most used in practice but there is a risk in use of this 
on valuation purposes. Third way to measure illiquidity is related to relative valuation. In 
this approach the illiquidity is tried to be estimated through transaction prices of similar 
illiquid assets, but if this is not possible, then illiquidity is measured by adjusting the 
discount factor as proposed in the second method. This study is interested in the research 
of an illiquidity discount method in order to estimate limited liquidity of shares. 
Earlier studies have found that the equity value is negatively correlated with the rela-
tive bid-ask spread and positively correlated with liquidity characteristics like the number 
of shareholders, trading volume and the number of market makers trading the share (see 
e.g. Amihud & Mendelson 1986; Amihud 2002, Loderer & Roth 2005). Moreover, there 
are evidences that illiquidity can explain differences in expected returns across shares and 
it has been proposed that over time expected illiquidity has a positive effect on expected 
stock returns (Amihud, 2002).  
The motivation for this study is multidimensional. In corporate finance, liquidity and 
especially lack of liquidity, has substantial consequences for decision-making and valua-
tion conclusions. Consequences can be divided into two levels. First, liquidity of securi-
ties limits possibilities of a company to raise capital with these securities, e.g. stocks and 
bonds. Second, liquidity of company’s assets may restrict decision-making. (Damodaran 
2005.) Butler, Grullon and Weston (2002) found that issuance costs of seasoned equity 
offerings are much higher for firms with less liquid shares and therefore they suggested 
that firms can lower the cost of capital with better market liquidity of the shares.  
One of the most challenging elements of privately-held company valuations is to ef-
fectively communicate the value of a non-marketable interest. Especially, the premium 
paid for marketability or a discount for lack of marketability should be taken into account 
in valuations and therefore it will be researched in this study. (Zanni, 2014.) Paglia and 
Harjoto (2010) investigated valuation adjustments for private companies. They tried to 
match private company transactions with publicly traded counterparts. Their study found 
that the discount for lack of marketability was averagely 65%-70% and exceeded 80% in 
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some sectors of the economy. In general, limited liquidity can reduce a potential equity 
value more than 50%. Hence, limited liquidity can be seen as a critical element on corpo-
rate finance. 
As it is noted earlier, investors pay lower prices or demand higher discounts on illiquid 
assets. Nowadays an increasing amount of wealth is allocated to asset classes which are 
typically priced at a discount, such as venture capital, private equity, initial public offer-
ings, commercial real estates and hedge funds. This highlights the fact that it is highly 
important to understand the illiquidity discounts on these assets. (Chen et al. 2015.) Grow-
ing interest in liquidity in asset-pricing has been verified also in empirical literature. How-
ever, earlier literature has focused mostly on U.S. data and used trading-volume as a proxy 
for limited liquidity. (Chan & Faff 2005.) Since the market environment in the Nordic 
markets differs from the US, it is interesting to research liquidity in asset-pricing con-
cerning the Nordic markets and compare these results to previous studies. The companies 
in the Nordic markets are typically smaller than in the US and moreover, marketability of 
shares are more limited, i.e. the stock markets are more efficient in the US than in the 
Nordics. However, the markets are more efficient globally nowadays than previous dec-
ades. Results show that generally there is a negative relation between liquidity and returns 
when using different proxies for liquidity (Loderer & Roth 2005). However, controversial 
results have also been found as Chen and Kan (1995, 12) did not find a reliable relation 
between returns and relative bid-ask spreads.   
1.2 Objectives and research limitations of the study 
The objective of this study is to investigate the pricing discount for limited liquidity by 
using directly the current share prices instead of the usually studied relation between his-
torical returns and various liquidity proxies. It is highly important to notice that if the 
markets value liquidity, it should be reflected in share prices. Therefore, this method is 
applicable to research limited liquidity.  
The research question in this study is following: how much an investor demands dis-
count from perfectly liquid equity value in the case of limited liquidity? The research 
question is divided into sub-research questions. These sub-research questions define the 
theoretical framework for this study and highlight the importance of limited liquidity in 
valuation purposes. The sub-questions are following:  
• How to define a fair market equity value and what characteristics should be 
taken into account in its valuation? 
• How to measure limited liquidity in valuation? 
By using the above-mentioned method, less data is required and it provides up-to-date 
information about an illiquidity discount. This kind of information is particularly valuable 
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after the financial crisis and in a market environment like Finland, Sweden and Norway, 
as a major part of the companies listed on stock exchanges are considered as small cap 
companies. Moreover, it is possible to use this method in private company valuations with 
little modifications. There is great probability that the illiquidity discount changes over 
time and moreover, this approach makes it possible to take it into account, as this ap-
proach provides up-to-date market information.  In addition, sovereign debt crisis in Eu-
rope increased volatility in stock markets like Finland, which had little to do with the 
actual crisis. These changes affect stock’s liquidity and can have permanent effects in 
stock markets for a long time. 
 Theoretically, it is highly interesting to investigate limited liquidity with relative bid-
ask spreads. Based on previous literature, it has been noted that relative bid-ask spread 
seems to work as a liquidity proxy due to its negative correlation coefficient between the 
market capitalizations i.e. the market value of equity and relative bid-ask spreads (see e.g. 
Loderer & Roth 2005). This implies that larger companies have smaller bid-ask spreads. 
With smaller bid-ask spread the liquidity is higher and the price-impact costs smaller. 
However, the bid-ask spread is not the only liquidity proxy and in this study, the average 
daily value of trading volume will be used as a liquidity proxy. 
Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of stock illiquidity on com-
pany valuation, the amount of discount for limited liquidity given by investors will be 
empirically tested. In other words, the purpose is to look at the pricing relevance of il-
liquidity directly at share prices mainly using methods used by Loderer and Roth (2005). 
The data will be analyzed from OMX Helsinki, OMX Stockholm and OMX Copenhagen 
stock exchanges between 1 January 2013 and 30 June 2016 and test whether it is possible 
to find a statistically and financially significant price-liquidity relation. In addition, the 
sample is divided into two separate samples to test whether the results are same as for the 
whole sample.  
To perform a regression, there has to be compounded a model which includes regres-
sion arguments for each particular firm. These arguments are the expected rate of earnings 
growth, firm’s payout ratio, risk of the share, market value of the firm’s equity and share’s 
liquidity. The regression model includes the firm size due to the evidences that risk-ad-
justed returns are affected by the size of the firm (Loderer & Roth 2005). 
Loderer and Roth (2005) state that there is a great advance in the use of this method to 
research limited liquidity effects on company valuation. According to them, the biggest 
benefit is that the approach reveals relation between equity value and liquidity. This dif-
fers from previous studies which have studied the historical relationships with return-
based methods. The main advance of this study, the relation between value and liquidity, 
is highly relevant since it fluctuates over time and with the approach used by Loderer and 
Roth, it will be able to take into account. Moreover, Loderer and Roth (2005) clarify that 
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the approach used by them avoids the problem of inadequate time-series data of mean 
returns.  
 In addition, this research method is relevant since it has not been studied before in the 
Nordic markets and the results might be very useful in practice. Therefore, this study tries 
to fill the research gap in the Nordic markets but also the other research objective is to 
provide up-to-date information about limited liquidity discounts in the Nordic markets, 
especially in Finland and in Sweden.  
This study has also its research limitations. The limitations are based on availability 
and reliability of data used in regression models. Because the regression models in this 
study need input information from the future expected growth rate for a company in ques-
tion, the only possibility to estimate these growth rates is to use analyst estimates. One 
should always be aware of the risk of the use of analyst estimates because there is a po-
tential conflict between academic studies and the purpose of analyst estimates. Usually, 
the analyst’s task is to create demand for shares and in the academic research, the objec-
tive is to get neutral and unaffected data. However, as long as expected earnings growth 
rates influence to pricing of assets, these are highly important components in this study 
and should be taken into account.  
The other research limitation concerns the data availability. As mentioned before, a 
major part of the companies listed on the Nordic exchanges are considered as small cap 
companies and this can mean that there are no analyst estimates or other needed data 
available in the databases. However, in this study the data is collected from three different 
stock exchanges and the total number of constituent firms is almost 600, and at the end 
of the day, all the needed data is available for 243 companies. At the moment, this kind 
of research is not possible to do only for the Finnish stock markets due to the lack of data.    
1.3 Structure of the study 
This section of the study provides background information, motivation, purposes and lim-
itations of the study. In addition, there is a short background section to the test design and 
data. The next chapters in the study are organized as follows. The second chapter, cost of 
capital, defines the concept of rate of required return which is a highly important factor 
in valuation and in this study. The rate of required return can be calculated for assets and 
liabilities. Therefore, there are two kinds of main components in cost of capital calcula-
tions. After defining the cost of assets, the cost of equity and the cost of debt, the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) will be defined, which is used as a discount factor in 
many valuation approaches. 
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The third chapter, valuation methods, deals with different types of valuation ap-
proaches. The valuation approaches can be divided into two categories, to an income ap-
proach and a market approach which differs from each other significantly. This study 
focuses on the income approach which is relevant regarding the limited liquidity. It is also 
a more theoretical and technical method to estimate a fair market enterprise value or eq-
uity value of the company in question. There are numerous income approaches but in this 
study, the most relevant is a discounted cash flow (DCF) method. Moreover, the study 
gives a short insight to a residual earnings valuation model and its close relative, an ab-
normal earnings growth valuation model.  
The fourth chapter, illiquidity and company valuation, first defines limited liquidity in 
a detail level and then the liquidity proxies are covered, especially the relative bid-ask 
spread as a proxy for liquidity but also average daily value of trading volume which is the 
other liquidity proxy in this study. At the end of the chapter, the relation between limited 
liquidity and company valuation will be studied.  
The fifth chapter starts the empirical part of the study. The fifth chapter includes the 
research design and the empirical results are presented in the sixth chapter. To be precise, 
the fifth chapter deals with the data of the study and variables used in the regressions, 
hypothesis and economic concerns. The sixth chapter presents the empirical results and 
provides interpretation and discussions about the results. In addition, the results are com-
pared to previous studies and questions arisen from this study are presented. The seventh 
chapter summarizes the literature and empirical part of thesis.  
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2 COST OF CAPITAL 
2.1 General considerations 
This chapter focuses on the cost of capital, its general considerations and the relation 
between cost of assets, cost of equity and cost of debt. In addition, the tax effects of in-
terest payments are covered. The cost of capital is an important factor in valuation since 
the value of an asset is theoretically the present value of the net future cash flows of the 
asset to the owner. The present value is calculated by discounting the future cash flows 
with a risk-adjusted discount rate. The cost of capital can be defined also as an opportunity 
rate of return, i.e. the same risk characteristics for an alternative investment or an asset 
should assure equals required rate of returns for both, a given and an alternative invest-
ment.  
To be precise, the firm value is a present value of future cash flows which are available 
for debt and equity holders. This cash flow pattern should be discounted at a cost of capital 
that reflects the cost of assets in overall, i.e. the risk of these firm’s assets. (Rosenbaum 
& Pearl 2009, 111.) Therefore, the intrinsic value of a firm reflects the value of assets in 
the balance sheet and the value of assets should be equal with the sum of debt and equity 
value, i.e. with the liabilities side of the balance sheet (Holthausen & Zmijewski 2012). 
The figure 1 illustrates that relation (Damodaran: Fair value accounting 2015). 
 
Figure 1 Fair market value balance sheet (Damodaran: Fair value accounting 2015) 
Theoretically, the value of debt is the present value of future cash flows from debt 
financing that is discounted at the cost of debt. Main cash flows from debt financing are 
interest payments and repayments of face value of the debt. The other part of the liabilities 
side of the balance sheet is the equity. The equity value is the present value of future cash 
Fair market value balance sheet 
Value of assets 
Value of 
equity 
Value of debt 
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flows that are available to equity holders, i.e. shareholders. The equity cash flow is dis-
counted at the cost of equity which reflects the risk of equity. The use of the cost of capital 
will be presented more technically in the valuation section.  
However, the main approach in practice is to value the firm with the DCF-model using 
a free cash flow to firm approach. Therefore, the free cash flows will be discounted with 
the average after tax return, which the providers of capital require, i.e. with the weighted 
average cost of capital. (Holthausen & Zmijewski 2012.)  
Before taking a closer look on components of the cost of capital, it is important to 
clarify some general considerations about the topic. First, it is highly needed to define a 
capital structure used in calculations. The capital structure can be divided into debt, mez-
zanine and equity financing. In general, the debt consists of all the interest bearing finan-
cial liabilities or claims, such as bonds and bank debt. Due to unequal position between 
debt holders and shareholders, there are different rights for both parties. Rights of debt 
holders are contractual, such as regular interest payments, repayment of nominal amount 
of face value of the debt, and if the debt is secured, then the debt holder has a right to get 
the underlying asset in the case of bankruptcy. Rights for shareholders are in the lower 
level in comparison with the rights for debt holders. Therefore, shareholders will only get 
residual cash flows and voting right at the company in question. The residual cash flow 
will be handled in the valuation section. (Damodaran: Capital structure: the choices and 
the trade off)  
2.2 Cost of assets 
At a terminology level, the cost of assets is required expected or average rate of return on 
assets. Without any outstanding debt, the cost of assets equals with the cost of equity. In 
a world without frictions, the cost of assets should reflect the risk of the firm’s business 
model and its overall operating risk. This means that it does not matter how the product 
or service is financed, it will always be the same product or service which will be sold 
and it generates cash flows to security holders. (Holthausen & Zmijewski 2012.) 
Since the balance sheet’s both sides are equals, the opportunity cost of the assets is the 
value of assets times the cost of assets. Thus, the opportunity cost of the debt and equity 
equals with the opportunity cost of the assets. This can be written as follows 








where A is the value of assets, kA is the cost of assets, D is the amount of debt, kD is the 
cost of debt, E is the amount of equity and kE is the cost of equity. (Holthausen & Zmi-
jewski 2012; Rosenbaum & Pearl 2009, 159.) Together the amount of debt and the 
amount of equity makes up the value of liabilities and it is equal to the value of assets.  
As proposed above, the cost of assets is only dependent on the risk of the firm’s oper-
ating activities in the world without frictions. Therefore, one can say that the cost of assets 
is given for the firm in question and the total value of the company should not depend on 
the capital structure in the perfect world (Modigliani & Miller 1958; Berk & DeMarzo 
2014, 480). However, it can be shown that the leverage increases the firm’s cost of equity 
as the equation for the cost of equity can be written as follows by modifying the equation 
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where the term D/E is a leverage component. (Modigliani & Miller 1958; Berk & De-
Marzo 2014, 489; Holthausen & Zmijewski 2012.) This interprets that the higher leverage 
increases the cost of equity due to a higher risk. Consequently, this shows that the debt 
financing is not a cheaper source of financing than equity. (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 489.) 
2.3 Tax effect of interest payments 
Since interest payments can be deducted from the taxable income, these tax savings add 
value of the asset or the investment project. Every interest euro paid saves the amount of 
the firm’s tax rate in tax payments. (Modigliani & Miller 1958.) The value adding tax 
savings should be taken into account in a valuation process (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 572). 
It can happen through a discount rate or by adding a so-called debt tax shield (DTS) to 
the company value. The DTS is defined as the present value of the future tax savings due 
to the interest payments. (Inselbag & Kaufold, 1997.) The value of the DTS can be cal-
culated as follows 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) =  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) 
                   = 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) 
                   = 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 × 𝐷𝐷,   
(3) 
where τc is a corporate tax rate and D is an amount of the firm’s permanent debt (Berk & 
DeMarzo 2014, 513). 
In some cases, it is recommended to use an adjusted cost of capital to take into account 
DTS and in other cases it is more preferrable to calculate the firm value as in the perfect 
world and add the incremental worth due to tax savings. It depends on the company’s 
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financing policy, if the debt target is an absolute dollar or euro etc. amount, the adjusted 
present value (APV) method is recommended. If the debt target is a specific debt ratio 
from the fair market value of the company, the adjusted cost of capital method is recom-
mended, i.e. the weighted average cost of capital approach. This is based on the fact that 
the DTS, therefore, has the same risk as the company’s assets. In this case the future tax 
savings are discounted with the cost of assets. However, in the first case where the amount 
of debt is an absolute euro amount, it is assumed that the DTS reflects the same risk as 
the company’s debt. In this case the future tax savings are discounted by using the cost of 
debt. (Inselbag & Kaufold, 1997; Holthausen & Zmijewski 2012.) 
The overall cost of capital of the company is needed in the valuation. Since the com-
pany’s assets are not traded in the markets, the cost of assets of the company is not directly 
observed even in the markets. Therefore, it is needed to estimate the firm’s cost of equity 
and the cost of debt. After that, by using these costs, one should compute the cost of assets 
and the weighted average cost of capital which is the cost of assets after taxes and it takes 
into account the tax effect of interest payments presented above (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 
514).  
2.4 Cost of equity 
The cost of equity is a required expected or average rate of return on equity. The previous 
literature presents various methods to estimate the cost of equity. The most popular and 
well-known method is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Moreover, in this study 
the dividend discount model is shown as a method to estimate the cost of equity. Accord-
ing to Graham and Harvey (2001) the CAPM is most used in practice (73.5%) by CFOs. 
The dividend discount model is also well-known and it is used by 16% of interviewed 
CFOs. Other methods in the cost of equity estimations include multifactor models. The 
arbitrage pricing theory by Ross (1976) is a well-known multifactor model. Multifactor 
models state that by using multiple portfolios as risk factors, all systematic risk is taken 
into account. However, different risk factors take into account different components of 
the systematic risk. (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 461-462; see also Ross 1976 and Merton 
1973.) One-third of CFOs in Graham and Harvey’s survey (2001) answered to use mul-
tifactor models in the cost of equity calculations. Moreover, 40% of CFOs answered to 
use a historical average return as a proxy for the cost of equity.   
The equation 4 presents the Gordon growth model as follows (Gordon 1962) 
𝑃𝑃0 =   




All the parameters are known except the required rate of return on equity varies. However, 
the current share price implicitly defines the cost of equity and the equation can be rear-
ranged as follows to solve the cost of equity 
𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸 =   
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃0 × (1 + 𝑔𝑔)
𝑃𝑃0
+ 𝑔𝑔. (5) 
Moreover, the cost of equity can be solved from this expression 
𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸 =   
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃1
𝑃𝑃0
+ 𝑔𝑔, (6) 
where DIV1 is the next year’s expected dividend. The expected growth rate of future div-
idends can be based on historical average payout ratio or analyst estimations. 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) developed capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) to depict the reliance between a risk of the share and a required rate of 
return of the share. (Dimson & Mussavian 1999). CAPM is based on Markowitz’s port-
folio theory and there are strong assumptions behind the model. These assumptions are 
also criticized by researchers. (Fama & French 2004.) The assumptions are following: all 
the investors act as Markowitz’s portfolio theory expects and therefore, optimize their 
portfolios in the sense of the optimal mean-variance relation, also investors have the same 
subjective or objective probability distributions of assets’ returns and relations between 
them, i.e. investors have a united opinion about the mean, variance and covariance of the 
return of the asset in question (this implies that all the investors have an equal amount of 
information in use), there is a same risk-free rate for lending and borrowing, and moreo-
ver, there are no transaction costs in the markets (Pilbeam 2010, 182–183). 
Sharpe (1964) states that it is possible to avoid a part of the risk of the share by diver-
sifying the whole portfolio broadly and therefore, the total risk of the share is not included 
into the share value. In the CAPM, the risk of the share is divided into a systematic and 
an unsystematic risk. It is not possible to avoid the systematic risk by diversifying the 
portfolio because this part of the risk is common and equal for every market participant. 
The systematic risk includes general economical phenomena such as trade cycles and 
political decisions. The unsystematic risk can be avoided by diversifying. The unsystem-
atic risk is the part of the risk which cannot be avoided by diversifying and it is caused 
by something else than factors that impact the return of the market portfolio, i.e. company 
specific factors. According to the CAPM, the unsystematic part of the risk does not matter 
in the defining of the required rate of return since the unsystematic risk is possible to 
diversify away. The systematic risk is the only source which impacts on the required ex-
pected rate of return of the share. An investor will not get any higher expected return for 
the share by carrying an unsystematic risk. (Niskanen & Niskanen 2007, 186, 189.)  
The CAPM can be written as follows  
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𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖[𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓)�, (7) 
where Rf is the risk-free rate of return, E(RM-Rf) is the estimated market risk premium, 
where E(RM) is the expected return for the market portfolio and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is the beta of the share 
in question. The beta is calculated by following: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖=𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝/𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝 (Fama & French 2004; 
Pilbeam 2010, 187). The beta is a function which expresses the variance of the share in 
question compared to the markets, but also with its covariance with the markets. If the 
share correlates perfectly with the market portfolio, i.e. 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖m=1 and if the standard devia-
tion of the share is the same as the market portfolio’s, i.e. 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖=𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝, the beta of the share is 
one and its expected returns is always in line with the return of the market portfolio. 
However, a share with beta lower than one, helps an investor to stabilize the portfolio. 
These kinds of shares are called defensive shares. Whereas, if the beta is more than one, 
a share is called an aggressive share. These kinds of shares increase the volatility of the 
portfolio and therefore, the expected return is higher but also the risk is larger. (Pilbeam 
2010, 187.) 
In the estimation of the beta by using a regression model, the expression is written as 
follows 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =∝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, (8) 
where ri,t is a continuously compounded stock return of a firm i measured from time (t-1) 
to t, rM,t is a continuously compounded market return measured from time (t-1) to t, αi and 
βi are regression coefficients (βi is the beta) and εi,t is the error term (Fama & French 
2004). 
The required rate of return can be divided into three components: the risk-free rate 
which measures the time value of money (i.e. the provision to investors that postpone 
consumption), the beta of the share measures the amount of the risk and the risk premium 
measures the market price of the risk (Pilbeam 2010, 188). 
The CAPM results a discount rate which takes into account the systematic risk. This 
discount rate is the required expected rate of return on equity, i.e. the cost of equity and 
it is highly used in many valuation models. (Niskanen & Niskanen 2007, 189.) 
In practice, there are a few important practical remarks in the beta estimation and in 
the CAPM estimation in general. First, there is no correct risk-free rate and it always 
depends on the term structure of the cash flows. However, many practitioners do not take 
this into account and use risk-free rates such as 10-year or 30-year government bond 
yields. Nowadays 30 years is more used due to very low interest rates globally. Moreover, 
a historical market risk premium is a backward looking measure and in valuations, the 
interest is in the expected annualized market risk premium, not in its historical value. 
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According to Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003), the arithmetic mean of historical eq-
uity risk premiums may exceed the geometric mean equity risk premium by several per-
centages due to market volatility. They suggest that investors and managers should adjust 
historical equity risk premiums downward due to a general decline in the risk and more 
diversified investment opportunities. 
In addition to the above-mentioned, the estimation period affects on the beta. With a 
longer estimation period, the statistical precision is higher but the question is, what does 
historical data tell about the future? In practice, a much used estimation period is from 
two to five years.  
Data frequency is a relevant question in the estimation of beta. Should one use daily, 
weekly or monthly returns? As above-mentioned, the statistical precision increases when 
the data points increase but what if the share is not traded much, i.e. the share is illiquid? 
Therefore, the daily data is not relevant for most of the cases, and weekly data is also 
doubtful in many cases except the most liquid shares. However, there is no correct esti-
mation period or data frequency.  
Moreover, it is important to notice that the beta estimations above are performed to 
traded assets. In the cases where assets or projects are not traded, the beta estimation 
should be done by finding a company with similar risk characteristics from the capital 
markets, i.e. an industry peer group company.  Due to different capital structures, first it 
would be better to calculate unlevered beta and then relevering the beta with the capital 
structure of the company in question. The equations (9) and (10) show unlevering and 
relevering procedures.  
𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈 =
𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿
�1 + 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 × (1 − 𝜏𝜏)�
 
𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈 × �1 +
𝐷𝐷
𝐸𝐸




where βU is an unlevered beta, βL is a levered beta from the peer group companies and 
D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio. (Rosenbaum & Pearl 2009, 130.)  
As mentioned before, the CAPM has been heavily criticized in previous literature over 
the last decades. For example, the CAPM is a single-period equilibrium model and it 
assumes that asset returns are linearly related to the beta, its only risk factor. Thus, the 
market beta should cover all the possible risk sources. Moreover, the portfolio of assets 
should be mean-variance efficient. If this assumption does not hold, the model is not in 
equilibrium. The CAPM also expects that asset returns have a joint multivariate Gaussian 
distribution or the utility function of investors is quadratic. (Copeland & Weston 1988, 
194-195.)  
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Due to shortcomings of the CAPM, various alternatives have been proposed. Ross 
(1976) presented the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) which says the expected return of an 
asset is a linear function of different macro-economic factors. Moreover, Fama and 
French (1993) published the three factor model. The three factor model takes into account 
the size factor, the market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio that are additional 
determinants of stock returns. Fama and French (1993) presented also a five factor model 
which identifies five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. The five 
factor model has statistically significant explanatory power for average returns on stocks 
and bonds (Fama & French 1993).  
Even if the CAPM has its drawbacks, it is highly used in the markets. Kothari, Shanken 
and Sloan (1995) showed that the factor models could suffer from hindsight bias. It is 
also possible that the factors include characteristics that change over time. In addition, it 
is hard to test the CAPM because it only observes the realized returns, not expected re-
turns. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) presented the conditional CAPM where the beta and 
the market risk premium are not constant over time. In other words, in the conditional 
CAPM, betas and market risk premiums are time-varying. Bali and Engle’s (2012) pre-
sented a model which produces betas that fluctuate over time, so-called dynamic condi-
tional correlation beta model. This model gives more weight on recent observations 
whereas an unconditional beta puts equal weight on all observations.  
However, Jagannathan and Wang (1996) gave three reasons why the CAPM is still so 
popular in spite of the lack of empirical support. They proposed that  
“In a way it [CAPM] reminds us of cartoon characters like Wile E. Coyote 
who have the ability to come back to original shape after being blown to 
pieces or hammered out of shape. Maybe the CAPM survives because a) 
the empirical support for other asset-pricing models is no better, b) the 
theory behind the CAPM has an intuitive appeal that other models lack, 
and c) the economic importance of the empirical evidence against the 
CAPM reported in empirical studies is ambiguous.” 
As argued above, the CAPM is an intuitive model to use in practice even though it might 
have some drawbacks. 
2.5 Cost of debt 
The cost of debt is a required expected or average rate of return on debt. If the company 
has different types of debt outstanding, the cost of debt is calculated by taking a weighted 
average required rate of return on the debt portfolio. The fundamental question of the cost 
of debt is why the cost of the debt is eventually higher than the risk-free rate, i.e. why it 
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is not as the CAPM proposes that there is one borrowing rate, the risk-free rate? The cost 
of the debt is a risk-free rate plus a risk premium. The risk premium of a debt based on a 
credit or a default risk of the borrower, i.e. the borrower cannot make the promised pay-
ments on time and/ or in full to a lender. The risk premium is also called as a credit spread. 
(Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 411-412.) In the following paragraphs, the cost of the debt is 
defined by using market prices and credit ratings. 
The cost of debt can be estimated from market prices, or to be more precise, from bond 
prices by calculating the yield-to-maturity (YTM) of a bond. The YTM is the promised 
return of the bond in question during one period (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 171). The equa-










where the period goes from time t to time T, the coupon is the coupon payment in time t 
and the NV is the nominal value of the bond. (Caks 1977; Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 173-
174.) The YTM includes two components, the risk-free rate of return and the promised 
credit spread. Therefore, the equation 11 can be written as follows 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = �
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
(1 + 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡
+
𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇




Since the YTM is based on the present value of the bond, i.e. the market value of the 
bond, it is needed to adjust the observed price which typically do not include accrued 
interest. This observed price is called as a quoted price or a clean price. The present value 
is called as a dirty price of the bond. Therefore, the present value of the bond is the quoted 
price plus the accrued interest, where the accrued interest is calculated with the equation 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = �1 −
𝐹𝐹
360
� × 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, (13) 
where t is the number of days to the next coupon payment. (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 179.) 
Even if the YTM is a highly used proxy for the cost of debt, it still has its drawbacks. The 
YTM is a good estimate for the cost of debt only in the case where the firm has a low 
default probability or an outstanding high recovery rate. Moreover, it is good to notice 
that the YTM is just calculated for one bond of the firm in question and does not represent 
all the outstanding debt. However, one should always remember that the coupon rate is 
not a good estimate for the cost of debt. (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 412.) 
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In addition to the market price method, the cost of debt can be estimated by using credit 
ratings from comparable companies or by generating a synthetic credit rating. The main 
idea in both of these credit rating methods is to estimate the creditworthiness of the firm 
in question, i.e. the firm’s financial risk. Firms with similar financial risk characteristics 
can be seen as comparable companies in the estimation of the credit spread and the cost 
of debt for the target firm. To do this, the target company has to have a credit rating or 
otherwise it is needed to compound a synthetic rating from the comparable companies. In 
the case of available credit rating for the target company, one should use that credit rating 
and implement it to an associated credit spread, e.g. provided by Damodaran. (Damodaran 
2002, 285-287.) For example, table 1 presents different rating categories and their inter-
pretations. 










AAA Aaa Prime 
AA Aa High grade 
A A Upper medium grade 










BB Ba Lower medium grade 
B B Speculative 
CCC Caa Poor standing 
CC Ca Highly speculative 
C C Lowest quality 
D  In default 
Table 1 Credit rating definitions by S&P and Moody’s (S&P Global; Moody’s) 
The above table 1 presents credit rating categories provided by the two most preferred 
rating agencies in the world, S&P and Moody’s. (S&P Global; Moody’s.) Based on Dam-
odaran’s database, the credit spreads for associated ratings are following 
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If an interest coverage ratio is 
> ≤ to Rating is Spread is 
8.50 100,000 AAA/Aaa 0.75% 
6.50 8.499 AA/Aa2 1.00% 
5.50 6.499 A+/A1 1.10% 
4.25 5.499 A/A2 1.25% 
3.00 4.2499 A-/A3 1.75% 
2.50 2.999 BBB/Baa2 2.25% 
2.25 2.499 BB+/Ba1 3.25% 
2.00 2.2499 BB/Ba2 4.25% 
1.75 1.999 B+/B1 5.50% 
1.50 1.7499 B/B2 6.50% 
1.25 1.499 B-/B3 7.50% 
0.80 1.2499 CCC/Caa 9.00% 
0.65 0.799 CC/Ca2 12.00% 
0.20 0.6499 C/C2 16.00% 
-100,000 0.199 D/D2 20.00% 
Table 2 Interest coverage ratios, credit ratings and credit spreads for large, non-financial 
service companies (Damodaran’s database) 
Table 2 is based on an interest coverage ratio and is applicable for large, non-financial 
service companies with the market cap more than five billion dollar. The credit spread 
range is from 0.75% to 20.00%.  
However, the credit rating is not always available for the company in question. There-
fore, one should compute a rating, a so-called synthetic rating. First, it is needed to ana-
lyze the factors that have impacts on the company’s creditworthiness. Based on Berk & 
DeMarzo (2014, 35-40), the factors that have an effect on the risk profile of the company 
are e.g. a size of the company, an interest coverage ratio and a leverage or a debt ratio. 
The interest coverage ratio is a highly used one and it is defined as the earnings before 
interest and taxes (i.e. EBIT) relative to interest payments (Graham & Harvey, 2001). 
Table 3 presents interest coverage ratios and credit ratings for smaller companies based 
on Damodaran’s database. 
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If an interest coverage ratio is 
> ≤ to Rating is Spread is 
12.50 100,000 AAA/Aaa 0.75% 
9.50 12.499 AA/Aa2 1.00% 
7.50 9.499 A+/A1 1.10% 
6.00 7.499 A/A2 1.25% 
4.50 5.999 A-/A3 1.75% 
4.00 4.499 BBB/Baa2 2.25% 
3.50 3.999 BB+/Ba1 3.25% 
3.00 3.499 BB/Ba2 4.25% 
2.50 2.999 B+/B1 5.50% 
2.00 2.499 B/B2 6.50% 
1.50 1.999 B-/B3 7.50% 
1.25 1.499 CCC/Caa 9.00% 
0.80 1.2499 CC/Ca2 12.00% 
0.50 0.799 C/C2 16.00% 
-100,000 0.499 D/D2 20.00% 
Table 3 Interest coverage ratios, credit ratings and credit spreads for small, non-finan-
cial service companies (Damodaran’s database) 
Table 3 is applicable for non-financial service companies with the market cap less than 
five billion dollars. The credit spread range is from 0.75% to 20.00%. 
The above-mentioned methods are focused on promised returns even if investors are 
usually interested in expected returns. It is important to remember that promised returns 
will be paid only if the bond does not default until maturity. However, for a company 
with a low default probability, it is a reasonable assumption to use the promised return as 
a proxy for the expected return. If the company in question has a high probability of de-
fault, it is needed to incorporate the default risk and the recovery rate to the estimation of 
the cost of debt. It can be calculated with the following equation 
𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷 = (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌 + 𝑝𝑝(𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌 − 𝐿𝐿) = 𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌 − 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿, (14) 
where p is the probability of default and L is an expected loss rate of the bond in the event 
of default. (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 412.) 
Generally speaking, changes in current bond prices should reflect better the credit risk 
of the company in question compared with credit ratings. This is based on market’s as-
sessment: the bond prices already include credit ratings and other public information and 
moreover, the bond prices are continuously investigated by the market participants.   
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2.6 Weighted average cost of capital 
As mentioned before, the free cash flows will be discounted with the average after tax 
return, which the providers of capital require, i.e. with the weighted average cost of capital 
(Damodaran 2002, 19). As also said, the cost of assets is not observed directly from the 
markets and therefore, it is needed to estimate the cost of equity and the cost of debt 
separately. By using these estimated required rate of returns in the cost of capital, and 
taking into account the capital structure and the fact that interest expenses are tax deduct-
ible, it is possible to compound the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The 
WACC includes tax savings by measuring the cost of debt after taxes as follows 







where kD*(1-τ) is the cost of debt after taxes. The WACC can be written as follows also 
(Holthausen & Zmijewski 2012; Inselbag & Kaufold 1997.) 




The equation 16 can be applied if the cost of assets is known and the cost of equity is 
unknown. 
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3 VALUATION METHODS 
3.1 General considerations 
The valuation methods can be divided into two different approaches, to an income ap-
proach and a market approach. Theoretically, the income approach takes into account all 
the company specific information in a cash flow projection for an explicit forecasting 
period. This method is more technical and tries to capture all details of the company in 
question. (Damodaran 2002, 16-34.) In this study, the income approach covers a dis-
counted cash flow model (DCF), a residual earnings valuation model (RE) and an abnor-
mal earnings growth model (AEG). The first is the preferred model by practice and two 
other models are accounting-based valuation models.   
In addition to the income approach, the market approach is a highly used valuation 
method in practice also. The market approach is a relative valuation method where a fair 
value of an asset based on realized prices of assets with similar characteristics. Generally, 
the market approach covers a trading multiple analysis and a precedent transaction mul-
tiple analysis. The idea of the trading multiple analysis is to value a company by using 
multiples at which publicly listed comparable companies trade in the markets. The idea 
of the transaction multiples analysis is to value a company by using actual historical mul-
tiples paid in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions involving comparable com-
panies. (Damodaran 2002, 16-34; Rosenbaum & Pearl 2009, 11-13, 71-106.) However, 
this study focuses only on the income approach which is a relevant approach regarding to 
the limited liquidity. 
3.2 Discounted cash flow model 
In the DCF-model, the focus is on the firm’s future ability to generate cash which ulti-
mately belongs to the providers of capital. However, cash is needed for pay e.g. salaries, 
taxes and bills. It has been seen that one of the most common reason for a bankruptcy is 
a lack of cash flow of the business (Uhrig 2005). 
The firm’s activities can be divided into three categories: investments, financing and 
operations. Investments are assets owned by the company, financing activities of the com-
pany define the ways how the assets are financed and operation activities is the uses of 
firm’s assets. (Nguyen, Cai & McColgan 2016.) Firm activities can be defined also in the 
terms of financial statements. Investments are presented in the left-hand side of the bal-
ance sheet in long-term assets, financing is presented in the right-hand side of the balance 
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sheet in liabilities and equity and operating activities are presented in the income state-
ment. Moreover, the cash flows can be defined by using these three activities, i.e. operat-
ing cash flow related to a production and sales, cash flow from investment and cash flow 
from financing. (Penman 2010, 32-39.) 
It is highly important to understand the mechanics of the cash flow statement used in 
the DCF-model. First, the accounting framework in the cash flow analysis is vital. There 
are three kinds of firm’s activities that lead to the net income in the income statement. 
Basically, every item above of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) is related to the 
operating activities of the company. However, interest expenses are financing activities 
and therefore, income taxes and the net income is a mixture of operating and financing 
activities of the company. (Penman 2010, 36.) 
The cash flow analysis starts from an adjustment of EBIT. The EBIT should be ad-
justed with tax expenses, i.e. with the tax amount without debt financing. This leads to a 
net operating profit less adjusted taxes (NOPLAT). The NOPLAT is the net income plus 
after-tax interest expenses. However, the NOPLAT is not a cash flow. To derive a free 
cash flow to the firm, the NOPLAT needs generally three adjustments: it is needed to add 
back depreciation and amortization, deduct capital expenditures and change in net work-
ing capital. (Damodaran 2002, 533-535.) The net working capital is defined as follows 
(Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 242) 
𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 
                                           = 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖. 
(17) 
The free cash flow (FCF) is an important and well-known cash flow figure in the DCF-
model valuation. The FCF presents the amount of money that is not tied up in the firm’s 
operating or investment activities and therefore, it is discounted with the WACC. Theo-
retically, the FCF can be divided to the providers of capital, i.e. security holders. (Berk & 
DeMarzo 2014, 284.) In conclusion, the equation 18 presents the FCF calculation 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑤𝑤
= 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × (1 − 𝜏𝜏) + 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
− 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 
(18) 
Even if the FCF is the most important cash flow figure, others are also used. The re-
sidual cash flow (RCF) is derived from FCF by deducting after-tax interest expenses and 
repayment of debt, i.e. by deducting cash flow outflows to debt holders and adding cash 
inflows to debt holders. Therefore, the RCF is theoretically available to the shareholders 
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and it can be used in the equity valuation. The RCF has to be discounted with the cost of 
equity. (Damodaran 2002, 459.) 
To derive normalized cash flows reflecting the firm actual businesses, the cash flow 
analyses need adjustments in some cases. The operating leases can greatly affect to a 
value conclusion. The operating leases are recorded as operating expenses even if those 
should be presented as debt financed asset investments in valuation purposes. To adjust 
the statements, it is needed to calculate the present value of future leasing expenses, acti-
vate this amount to the balance sheet and add a corresponding debt amount, depreciate 
the activated item in the balance sheet according to a relevant depreciation plan and de-
crease the debt at the same time with the same amount. In addition to that, operation leases 
should be added back to the EBIT. (Damodaran 1999.)  
After all of the above-mentioned steps and other needed cash flow adjustments, the 
cash flows are ready to valuation purposes. The next step in the DCF-model is to compute 
forecasts over an explicit forecasting period. In theory, there are two ways to project items 
in the income statement and in the balance sheet and therefore in the cash flow statement. 
It can be done by using a T-account method or a percentage-of-sales method. The first 
means that individual positions are estimated explicitly and the second means that the 
sales are forecasted first and all the other items are based on the forecasted sales as a 
percentage of sales, where the percentage ratio can be estimated by using historical aver-
age. 
As mentioned in the chapter 2.3, the DTS can be taken into account two different ways, 
by using an adjusted cost of capital (i.e. WACC approach) or by discounting cash flows 
with the cost of assets and adding the incremental worth created by leverage (i.e. APV 
approach). The decision depends on the financing policy of the company. If the debt target 
is in nominal currency amount, the APV approach is recommended. If the debt target is 
a fixed debt ratio, the WACC approach is recommended. This is based on the fact that the 
DTS has the same risk as the company’s assets since the debt amount fluctuates with the 
firm value. Thus, the future tax savings are discounted with the cost of assets. However, 
if the debt amount is a nominal amount, it is assumed that the DTS reflects the same risk 
as the company’s debt since the DTS fluctuates with the amount of debt. In this case the 
DTS is discounted by using the cost of debt. (Inselbag & Kaufold, 1997; Holthausen & 
Zmijewski 2012.) The present value of the DTS can be calculated as follows in the APV 
approach 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) = �





In the DCF valuation the selection between APV and WACC approaches is crucial. 
The WACC approach values the company as a levered corporation and the APV approach 
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values the firm as an equity financed corporation and adds all the incremental worth cre-
ated by leverage. The equation 20 presents the DCF-WACC approach  






Thus, the firm value is capitalized future free cash flows where the discount rate is the 
WACC. (Inselbag & Kaufold, 1997; Damodaran 2002, 537.) 
If the future tax savings can be forecasted explicitly, then the APV method can be 
used. However, it means that the future amounts of debt outstanding should be known. 
As mentioned, then the future tax savings have the same risk as the debt outstanding and 
therefore it can be discounted with the cost of debt. Then the firm value can be calculated 
with the equation 21 







where PV(DTS) is the present value of the debt tax shield as presented in the equation 19 
(Inselbag & Kaufold, 1997). 
In conclusion, the DCF-model tries to capture all the relevant information of the com-
pany in question. The fair market value of the firm (or the enterprise value (EV)) is the 
sum of each year’s discounted free cash flow to the firm and a continuing value which 
can be defined by using previous year’s figures and the Gordon growth model as pre-
sented in the equation 1 where the DIV0 is replaced with the previous year’s FCF, k is the 
cost of capital and g is an assumed growth rate. (Berk & DeMarzo 2014, 285; Penman 
2010, 117.) The fair market value of equity is calculated from the firm value by deducting 
debt and adding cash and cash equivalents (Penman 2010, 123). Moreover, the equity 
value can be calculated by capitalizing residual cash flows.  
3.3 Residual earnings model 
The main concept in the residual earnings valuation is to anchor the value on book value 
of an asset and future forecasted residual earnings. Hence, the anchoring principle is based 
on that the asset which earns a return equal to its required return on its book value, the 
asset is worth of its book value. If the forecasted return on book value is higher than the 
required rate of return, in absolute terms, the asset generates positive residual earnings 
and the asset value is higher than its book value, i.e. the price-to-book (P/B) ratio is more 
than 1.0. However, the situation is opposite if the return on book value is less than the 
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required rate of return and then the P/B ratio is less than 1.0. The equity value can be 
calculated as follows 






where B0 is the current book value of equity on the balance sheet, ρE is (1+kE) and RE is 
residual earnings for equity. The RE is calculated as follows 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − (𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 − 1)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1, (23) 
where Earnt is comprehensive earnings and Bt-1 is the beginning-of-period book value. 
(Penman 2010, 153; Easton, Taylor, Shroff & Sougiannis 2002.)  
The intrinsic premium over book value of equity is value of common equity minus the 
current book value of equity and this is equal to the present value of residual earnings. If 
residual earnings are forecasted only for an explicit forecasting period, e.g. for five years, 
then it is needed to add the terminal value term to the equation 22. Hence, the equation 
22 will be modified as follows 









In conclusion, by using the residual earnings model in valuation, three things are needed: 
the current book value, expected residual earnings over an explicit forecasting period and 
a horizon premium. The horizon premium is the premium of a share’s expected value 
over the book value in time T. (Penman 2010, 153-155.) 
However, there is a problem in applying the equation 24 to practice since the present 
value of equity is a function of value of equity T periods from now. Therefore, the horizon 
premium in equation 24 is replaced with the Gordon growth model in order to be able to 
calculate the continuing value for the share in question. The equation 25 expresses this 
(Penman 2010, 163.) 




𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 × (1 + 𝑔𝑔)




/𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 . (25) 
The fair market equity value is the current book value of equity sum capitalized expected 
residual earnings over an explicit forecasting period and the discounted terminal value 
calculated with the Gordon growth model. 
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3.4 Abnormal earnings growth model 
In the abnormal earnings growth valuation model, the main concept is to calculate capi-
talized forward earnings and add the extra value created by abnormal cumulative dividend 
(cum-dividend) earnings growth. Therefore, the principle is that the asset value should be 
equal to its capitalized earnings if the cum-dividend earnings will grow at a rate equal to 
the required rate of return. (Penman 2010, 199; Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth 2005; Jorgen-
sen, Lee & Yoo 2011.) 
If the cum-dividend earnings growth rate is higher than the required rate of return, the 
asset value is higher than its capitalized earnings and vice versa. The cum-dividend earn-
ings can be defined as follows 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + (𝜌𝜌 − 1) × 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1, (26) 
where the ρ is 1 plus the cost of capital. (Penman 2010, 196.) 
The earnings that grow at a rate equal to the required rate of return are called normal 
earnings at time t, i.e.  
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1, (27) 
However, one is not interested in paying for normal earnings. Investors are willing to pay 
for the cum-dividend earnings growth over these normal earnings, i.e. investors pay for 
the abnormal earnings growth. The abnormal earnings growth at time t can be calculated 
as follows (Penman 2010, 197.) 
𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡
= 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
                           = [𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + (𝜌𝜌 − 1)𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1] − 𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1. 
(28) 
In conclusion, if the cum-dividend growth is equal to the required return, the asset 
value is equal to its capitalized earnings, therefore one is willing to pay only for value-
adding growth. Moreover, the cum-dividend growth is a better measure than ex-dividend 
growth in the analyses of earnings growth since the first mentioned takes into account the 
reinvestment of dividends. (Penman 2010, 197.) As Loderer and Roth (2005) also found, 
the payout ratio is irrelevant to valuation purposes. Penman (2010, 197) also states that 
the payout ratio is irrelevant to valuation since the cum-dividend earnings growth is not 
depending on dividends.  
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The abnormal earnings growth (AEG) is used in valuation. The value of equity can be 













where there are basically two different components, the capitalized forward earnings and 
extra value for abnormal cum-dividend earnings growth. The equation 29 can be written 










Moreover, the value of equity can be calculated by using current earnings instead of 
forwards earnings. Hence, the valuation equation is following 









where d0 is the current’s year dividend. (Penman 2010, 203; Ohlson 2005; Penman 2005.)  
The AEG can also be written as a change in the residual earnings, i.e. AEG = ∆RE. 
The equations 32, 33 and 34 prove this (Penman 2010, 208; Penman 2005) 
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = [𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + (𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 − 1)𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1] − 𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 
                                        = 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 − ((𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 − 1)(𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1). 
(32) 
Due to the equation of stocks and flows, the book value of equity can be written as follows 
(Penman 2010, 208; Penman 2005) 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 
                      𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−2. 
(33) 
Therefore, the AEG equation 32 can be written as follows again (Penman 2010, 208) 
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𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 − (𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 − 1)(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−2) 
           = [𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − (𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 − 1)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1] − [𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 − (𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 − 1)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−2] 
                         = 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1. 
(34) 
In valuation purposes, the AEG model should be written by using also a continuing value 








𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 × (1 + 𝑔𝑔)





where there are basically three different components, the capitalized forward earnings, 
extra value for abnormal cum-dividend earnings growth over an explicit forecasting pe-
riod and the discounted terminal value calculated with the Gordon growth model.  
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4 ILLIQUIDITY AND COMPANY VALUATION 
4.1 Limited liquidity 
In the perfect world, the investments should have the same values for every company in 
the market. The proof of that is the arbitrage. An asset which is sold under the fair market 
value will be bought by an investor who can sell the asset afterwards with the fair market 
value and therefore earns risk-free return. However, the arbitrage is not possible if there 
are no other investors who want to buy the asset even if it would be sold at a fair market 
price. It means that there is limited tradability, i.e. limited liquidity or illiquidity in the 
markets. Assets with limited liquidity are trading at a discount in order to be interesting 
in the markets. Moreover, the transactions costs are related to limited liquidity. (Amihud 
& Mendelson 2012; see also Loderer & Roth 2005.) An illiquid company typically has a 
larger bid-ask spread and therefore the buyers and sellers are more difficult to find.  
Liquidity has significant effects on valuation of corporate shares and bonds. The lim-
ited liquidity increases required returns and thus lowers prices. However, increasing li-
quidity of a firm’s shares and bonds can decrease the firm’s required rate of return and 
therefore increase the market value of the firm in question. (Amihud & Mendelson 2012.) 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) research paper reveals that financial policy which sup-
ports liquidity of a share increases the share value by decreasing the opportunity cost of 
capital of the company. In general, publicly traded companies have better trading volume 
on their shares and the liquidity costs remain in a low level compared to private compa-
nies. If a company is small, trading is done on an over-the-counter basis and it is a private 
business, this implies that the possible investor clientele is restricted also. (Damodaran 
2005.) 
One well-known way to estimate illiquidity of an asset is to measure its immediate 
execution costs. In that case, an investor faces a tradeoff between time and money: the 
investor can sell the asset immediately at a lower price or wait to get a more favorable 
price from the asset. (Amihud & Mendelson 1986.) 
Amihud and Mendelson (2012) state briefly the definition of liquidity costs. They ar-
gued that the “liquidity costs are the costs associated with executing a transaction in the 
capital markets.” Moreover, they proposed that these costs can be disentangled into two 
components: direct trading costs and price-impact costs. First includes brokerage com-
missions, exchange fees and taxes. Second is a pricing discount or a premium when buy-
ing and selling an asset, respectively. These price-impact costs can have a significant 
effect on company valuation and this price-impact will be researched in this study. (Ami-
hud & Mendelson 2012.)  
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Limited liquidity has serious consequences on different levels in finance. Damodaran 
(2005) defined three aspects where illiquidity is a crucial element in finance: in the deci-
sion of going public or private, in portfolio management and in corporate finance. First, 
the decision between going public or staying private and vice versa reflects the tradeoff 
between control and liquidity of the company. If the company goes public, the opportunity 
cost of capital, i.e. required rate of return decreases probably and the value of the company 
increases since the liquidity would be higher. However, the control of a public company 
is widely divided and the management or the old owners cannot do decisions without 
other shareholders’ approval. Of course, the decision of going private is also a tradeoff 
between the above-mentioned. There Damodaran still sees that the cost of illiquidity 
should be lower due to an assumption that the company will be listed in the near future 
again. (Damodaran 2005.)  
Second, investors take into account illiquidity in their investment decisions, perfor-
mance evaluation and risk management. Third, illiquidity affects also in corporate finance 
where measures should be adjusted to reflect illiquidity, e.g. the cost of capital needs an 
illiquidity premium or an illiquidity discount is used in valuation. Moreover, compensa-
tion, financing and dividend decisions of the company are considered by taking into ac-
count the limited liquidity of the company. Companies with liquid securities can pay more 
dividend and keep cash and cash equivalents at a minimum since they know that they can 
raise new capital with low transaction costs to fund shortfalls. (Damodaran 2005.) 
4.2 Proxies for illiquidity 
There are various illiquidity proxies used in the previous literature. Chen et al. (2015) 
measure illiquidity by using turnover, bid-ask spread, exchange listing and market capi-
talization variables. Loderer and Roth (2005) used also bid-ask spread as a main proxy 
for limited liquidity but they also used an average daily value of trading volume as a proxy 
for limited liquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (2002) used a ratio of a share’s absolute 
daily return to its daily dollar volume as a proxy for illiquidity of a share. With this ap-
proach they try to capture the daily share price change relative to a dollar of trading vol-
ume. 
Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) suggested that effective spread and amortized spread 
could work as proxies for illiquidity. Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998) proposed that a 
share turnover or a turnover rate would be a proxy for limited liquidity. Share turnover is 
defined as a number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. Bren-
nan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) suggested trading volume for a liquidity proxy. 
Moreover, market depth, the number of shareholders, the number of market makers and 
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the price impact of trading have been proposed in the previous literature (Loderer & Roth 
2005).  
In this study, the bid-ask spread is used as a proxy for limited liquidity due to support-
ing empirical evidence from previous literature (see e.g. Loderer & Roth 2005; Amihud 
& Mendelson 1986; Chen et al. 2015). However, it is admitted that there are discussions 
about the bid-ask spread in the terms of liquidity measure. The previous literature has 
questioned whether the bid-ask spread measures liquidity correctly or not. (Grossman & 
Miller 1988; Loderer & Roth 2005.) Moreover, trading volume will be also used as an 
additional measure of liquidity. 
Roll (1984) studied the effective bid-ask spread with the first-order serial covariance 
of price changes. He found that the implicit trading costs measured by the bid-ask spread 
were strongly negatively related to firm size. Moreover, Roll (1984) found a sizeable 
difference of the effective bid-ask spread estimated from daily and weekly data. Accord-
ing to Roll (1984), it implies that the markets were informational inefficiency. 
According to Glosten and Harris (1988), the bid-ask spread is a function of trade size. 
Furthermore, they discussed that the bid-ask spreads are driven by asymmetric infor-
mation and inventory considerations. The results of their study cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that the bid-ask spreads are due to asymmetric information. Moreover, Coller and 
Yohn (1997) examined management forecasts and information asymmetry by using the 
bid-ask spread as a measure of information asymmetry. Their results showed that bid-ask 
spreads increase the day of and the day after the management forecasts date. However, 
the results also showed that the bid-ask spread was significantly lower nine days after the 
announcement than it was prior to the forecast release. This implies that management 
forecasts reduce information asymmetry in the market and the bid-ask spread includes a 
component of asymmetric information. It can be also implied that lower information 
asymmetry increase liquidity of the share. However, in this study asymmetric information 
is not taken into account in the bid-ask spread since the spread is seen as a function of 
liquidity of the company.  
4.3 Illiquidity in valuation 
4.3.1 General considerations 
As mentioned before, limited liquidity has direct and indirect costs. The direct costs in 
valuation will be taken into account in cash flow analyses since they are easy to observe. 
However, indirect price-impact costs are much harder to take into account in valuation. 
(Damodaran 2005.)  
37 
Damodaran suggested three ways to incorporate the illiquidity effect on company val-
uation. First, calculate the value of a liquid asset and then use an illiquidity discount which 
is regressed from the actual market data (see also Loderer & Roth 2005). Second, calcu-
late the cost of capital for the share and then take into account the asset specific illiquidity 
and sum the illiquidity premium to the calculated cost of capital. This method seems to 
be the most used in practice but there is a risk in the use of this on valuation purposes. 
Third way to measure illiquidity is related to relative valuation. In this approach the il-
liquidity is being tried to estimate through transaction prices of similar illiquid assets, but 
if this is not possible, then illiquidity is measured by adjusting the discount factor as pro-
posed in the second method. In this study, the illiquidity premium and the illiquidity dis-
count methods are studied further. It is important to avoid to the use of both of these at 
the same time.  
4.3.2 Illiquidity premium 
In valuation, the illiquidity premium is used as an additional component in the WACC. It 
can also be referred to as a small company risk premium. This leads to higher discount 
rate and relatively lower expected present value of future cash flows. However, the size 
of the illiquidity premium is discussed. (Damodaran 2005.) 
Damodaran (2005) presents three ways to estimate the illiquidity premium: add a con-
stant illiquidity premium to the discount rate for all illiquid assets, add a firm-specific 
illiquidity premium or relate the observed illiquidity premium on traded assets to specific 
characteristics of those assets.  
First, by adding a constant illiquidity premium the risk of the size of a company is been 
reflected. Usually, the cost of equity is assumed to be 3.0-3.5% higher for smaller com-
panies, reflecting the excess returns earned by small cap companies over long estimation 
periods. Moreover, Ibbotson Associates provides small company risk premiums for dif-
ferent company sizes and many practitioners consider these as illiquidity premiums and 
add those to the cost of equity. It is should be noted that the smallest companies listed by 
Ibbotson Associates are much larger than typical private companies. Venture Economics 
also provides own estimations for illiquidity premiums. They estimated that the returns 
are 4% higher for venture capital investors than returns on traded shares. (Damodaran 
2005.) 
Second, by adding a firm-specific illiquidity premium the firm-specific characteristics 
are taken into account. Hence, the results should reflect better the fair value of the busi-
ness. In this approach, it is needed to measure how much the company is exposed to 
liquidity risk, i.e. one should be interested in liquidity betas for individual companies. 
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The liquidity beta measures how the trading volume varies with the market trading vol-
ume over time. (Damodaran 2005.) 
   Third, companies with a healthier business model and with liquid assets should have 
lower illiquidity premium than companies with poor business model and illiquid assets. 
There the discount rate is a subjective view. (Damodaran 2005.)   
4.3.3 Illiquidity discount 
In the DCF valuation, the illiquidity effects are not taken into account in cash flows and 
usually the discount rate is calculated for the pure liquid business. There the solution is 
to apply the illiquidity discount. Thus, the WACC should be calculated without any small 
company risk premiums, i.e. illiquidity premium in the WACC as presented in the previ-
ous sub-chapter. For large publicly traded firms, it is not necessarily needed to use a pre-
mium or a discount since the liquidity is high but for small companies, the adjustment is 
needed. (Damodaran 2005.) The question is how much this illiquidity discount should be 
and is it always the same amount? This is the main question and research topic in this 
study.  
Damodaran (2005) suggests different approaches to estimate a size for the illiquidity 
discount in practice: fixed discount for all firms, firm-specific discount, synthetic bid-ask 
spread and option-based discount. In this study, the fixed discount and firm-specific dis-
count are covered. 
  The fixed discount or a discount range provided by analysts is used among practi-
tioners in company valuation. Moreover, this method is widely used in textbooks regard-
ing private company valuations but also in court cases. The previous studies have found 
that the discount range for illiquid shares is 25-35%. (Damodaran 2005.) 
The firm-specific discount is supported by previous literature since illiquidity dis-
counts should be different between assets and businesses. Especially, the illiquidity dis-
count should be a function of the company size in the case of a private company. (Dam-
odaran 2005.) The size of this firm-specific discount for a private company will be re-
searched in this study also. Damodaran (2005) states five components that cause illiquid-
ity differences across firms: liquidity of assets owned by the company, financial health 
and cash flows of the company, possibility of going public in the future, size of the com-
pany and control component, i.e. are you buying controlling stake of the company (51% 
vs. 49%). 
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4.4 Empirical results of previous studies 
Reilly and Rotkowski (2007) have collected empirical results from the studies related to 
discounts for lack of marketability. They dealt with equity placement studies where shares 
were unregistered, i.e. restricted, which means that the shares cannot be freely traded on 
stock exchanges even if the issuer company is publicly traded. Therefore, the company 
should accept a price discount on their issued restricted shares. The price discount is the 
difference between the public share price and the same company identical private share 
price in this context. The collected results are presented in the next paragraph. 
First, SEC institutional investor study (1971) showed that the average price discount 
was 24% for transactions between 1966 and 1969. This study compared public shares to 
identical private shares in the US. SEC’s study also concluded that the price discount was 
35% for shares traded on the over-the-counter markets. In Gelman’s (1972) study, aver-
age and median price discounts were 33% and moreover, 60% of the restricted shares 
include the price discount more than 30%. Trout (1977) studied the price discounts with 
regression analysis and he concluded that the average price discount was 34% for re-
stricted share transactions between 1968 and 1972. Based on Moroney’s (1973) study, 
the average price discount for restricted shares was 36% between 1969 and 1972. Maher’s 
(1976) almost identical results support Moroney’s study. The study of Hertzel and Smith 
(1993) proposed that the average price discount for the private placements should be ap-
proximately 20%. Moreover, Silber (1991) studied the private placements of public com-
panies between 1981 and 1988 and the results showed the average price discount of 34%. 
The private placements were studied by Bajaj, Denis, Ferris and Sarin (2001) also and 
they found the average price discount for unregistered share issues of 28%. Their empir-
ical analyses included transactions between 1990 and 1995. Johnson (1999) studied re-
stricted share issues between 1991 and 1995 and his results proposed the average price 
discount of 20%. The newest study was Robak’s (2007) paper where the results showed 
the average price discount of 33%. 
However, one should remember that this study is not focused on restricted share issues 
but the liquidity discounts for publicly traded shares. Therefore, the above-mentioned re-
sults are not perfectly comparable. Moreover, the estimates resulted from the restricted 
share issue studies can be damaged by factors which are not related to limited liquidity 
(Loderer & Roth 2005; see also Hertzel & Smith 1993).  
Loderer & Roth (2005) studied the pricing discount across time from the Swiss stock 
markets but also from the NASDAQ. They found that the median pricing discount in the 
Swiss stock markets fluctuated between 6% and 21% during 1995 and 2001. At the same 
time, the median pricing discount in the NASDAQ fluctuated between 25% and 33%. In 
conclusion, previous literature suggests that average or median discounts are more than 
40 
20% in the most of the cases even though discounts could also be much smaller as noted 
in the Swiss stock markets. 
Officer (2007) studied the price of corporate liquidity by looking at acquisition dis-
counts for unlisted targets. He found that stand-alone private companies and subsidiaries 
of other firms have average acquisition discounts of 15% to 30% relative to acquisition 
multiples for similar publicly traded targets. 
Paglia and Harjoto (2010) investigated valuation adjustments for private companies. 
They tried to match private company transactions with publicly traded counterparts. Their 
study found that the discount for lack of marketability was averagely 65%-70% and ex-
ceeded 80% in some sectors of the economy. The results are much higher in comparison 
with restricted stock, IPO and acquisition studies. Therefore, according to them, the re-
sults question sizes of discounts typically applied in valuation engagements for privately-
held companies. 
Zanni (2015) collected results from previous studies concerning private companies and 
found support to Paglia and Harjoto’s results. Collectively, the previous studies provide 
evidence that private companies often sell at lower multiples than their public counter-
parts due to the lack of liquidity or marketability. Zanni (2015) concluded that when val-
uing a private company, by reference to a similar characteristics public company, the 
liquidity discount should be taken into account. According to Zanni (2015), the transac-
tion multiples are influenced by subject company size and profitability. 
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5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 General considerations 
A cross-sectional regression approach will be applied as an econometric method in this 
study. First, a general framework is set for this study, which enables the observation of 
share prices, i.e. valuation of shares as the present value of constantly growing dividend 
flow. The equation for this is the same as the Gordon growth model 
𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒 − 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴) 𝑃𝑃0 =   
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃0 × (1 + 𝑔𝑔)
𝑘𝑘 − 𝑔𝑔
, (36) 
where P is the share price, DIV0 is dividend per share at the moment, g is the expected 
dividend growth rate and k is the required rate of return (Gordon 1962). The ex-dividend 
status means that the dividend is distributed to the shareholders of the company in ques-
tion (Penman 2010, 199). Moreover, it is needed to do an assumption that the payout ratio 
(π) will be constant in the future. Therefore, the dividend component is replaced with 
product of earnings-per-share and payout ratio. By doing this assumption, the equation 
can be rearranged and it is possible to get an expression for a price to earnings (P/E) ratio 
as following   




π × (1 + 𝑔𝑔)
𝑘𝑘 − 𝑔𝑔
, (37) 
where EPS0 is the current earnings-per-share of a firm. As the P/E ratio is stated in equa-
tion 37, the cross-sectional determinants of P/E ratios should include payout ratios, ex-
pected earnings growth rates and required rate of returns. However, equation 37 implicitly 
assumes the current earnings-per-share which are given. In this study, it is really im-
portant to note that in a cross-section for both prices and current earnings-per-share can 
change. Hence, it is not likely that the functional form of equation 37 applies in a cross-
sectional analysis. Therefore, a more general relation must be formed in order to test the 
research question. (Loderer & Roth 2005.) First, in order to be able to do a cross-sectional 
comparison, it should be assumed that the risk-free rates and market risk premiums are 
the same through the sample (Loderer & Roth 2005)1. 
The function (38) models the P/E ratio 
                                                 
1 This assumption has naturally limits as especially market risk premiums tend to be time-varying but also 
risk-free rates has been seen volatile in the near past. 
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P/E ratio𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖), (38) 
where i refers to the firm in question. Based on regression specifications reported in the 
return-liquidity literature, the equation 38 is consistent (Loderer & Roth 2005).  
This regression model interprets that the P/E ratio can be explained by following factors: 
growth rate, payout ratio, risk of the firm, firm’s size and liquidity. The section 5.1 gives 
more insight into these factors used in the regression model.  
Loderer and Roth (2005) define some expectations related to the cross-sectional regu-
larities. First, they expect that higher expected earnings growth increases share prices and 
therefore raise P/E ratios. Second, a higher risk usually increases EPS, lowers share prices 
and net effect from these should be lower than the P/E ratio. Third, greater company size 
lowers the required rate of return and this raises P/E ratios. Fourth, higher liquidity de-
creases required rate of return and therefore increases P/E ratios. Last, Loderer and Roth 
state that the higher payout ratio has an unclear effect on the P/E ratio even though in 
perfect markets the payout should be irrelevant (see Modigliani & Miller 1961). 
5.2 Variables 
The dependent variable in this study is the P/E ratio (P/E ratio) and its natural logarithm 
(ln(P/E)). The P/E ratio is assumed to reflect the company’s valuation since it is not plau-
sible that illiquidity can affect a firm’s earnings even if it can have a significant effect on 
company valuation. Thus, the illiquidity effects can be researched with the P/E ratio. The 
P/E ratio is based on the share price as at 30 June 2016 and 2015 reported earnings. The 
price and earnings data is downloaded from Thomson Reuters Eikon.  
The independent variables in this study are the above-mentioned regression factors. 
The growth factor in this study is forecasted earnings-per-share growth rates for 2016E 
and 2017E by analysts (EPSg2016 & EPSg2017). The growth rate estimates are down-
loaded from Thomson Reuters Eikon as at 24 August 2016.  
The payout factor (Payout ratio) in this study is based on reported 2015A dividend and 
earnings information. All the values are calculated in euros. The data is collected from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon.  
The risk factor in this study is the beta of the company (Beta). The beta is calculated 
by using total return indices and taking a natural logarithm from monthly returns between 
1 January 2013 and 30 June 2016. The market portfolio is the index of the country in 
question, i.e. in Finland OMX Helsinki, in Sweden OMX Stockholm and in Denmark 
OMX Copenhagen. All the necessary beta data is downloaded from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream.  
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The size factor is the market capitalization of the company (Size). The market capital-
ization is calculated by using an average share price between 1.1.2016 and 30.6.2016 and 
number of shares outstanding as at 30.6.2016. All the company values in appendix 1 are 
in millions of euros. It should be noted that if the company has more than one share class, 
the most liquid one is used. Moreover, the size of the company is shown as a natural 
logarithm in the regression model (LNSIZE). The data is downloaded from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon.  
In this study the liquidity factor is approximated by using two different liquidity prox-
ies. At first, a relative bid-ask spread (RELSP) is used and in addition to that, the natural 
logarithm of an average value of daily trading volume is studied (LNVOLUME). The 
relative bid-ask is calculated following: (ask price – bid price)/bid price. The relative bid-
ask spread is calculated daily basis in this study and the average of these daily estimates 
is based on 1 January 2013 - 30 June 2016 point estimates. Furthermore, in a first linear 
regression the relative bid-ask spread is raised to the second power (RELSP2) as Loderer 
and Roth (2005) did. The data is downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Datastream.   
5.3 Sample characteristics 
The whole sample, the constituent firms listed on Helsinki, Stockholm and Copenhagen, 
includes 588 companies, 134 from OMX HEL, 313 from OMX STO and 141 from OMX 
CPH. However, all the needed data is not available for the whole sample. This refers to 
unavailable analyst estimates and other market data in the database. Thus, 243 companies 
are researched at the end of the day. The whole sample includes 66 companies from OMX 
HEL, 142 from OMX STO and 35 from OMX CPH. The figure 2 illustrates the process 
of the data collection in this study.  
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Figure 2 Data collection and availability 
Even if 59% of the companies have been eliminated in the data collection process, still 
243 companies is a good starting point to perform regression analyses and enables to 
divide the whole sample into two separate samples to test whether the results are same as 
for the whole sample. 










P/E ratio 243 2.93 13.53 18.07 21.33 24.43 171.84 15.65 
ln(P/E) 243 1.07 2.61 2.89 2.89 3.20 5.15 0.58 
EPSg2016 243 -83.2% -4.2 % 12.8% 23.9% 37.9% 288.9% 56.0% 
EPSg2017 243 -53.6% 4.8 % 11.2% 16.1% 24.3% 184.6% 25.4% 
Payout ratio 243 0.0% 34.0 % 49.3% 58.1% 70.6% 352.6% 48.7% 
Beta 243 0.02 0.57 0.79 0.81 1.06 1.81 0.36 
Size 243 1.6 199.8 799.1 4034.9 2935.7 97841.0 9967.1 
LNSIZE 243 14.3 19.1 20.5 20.6 21.8 25.3 1.8 
RELSP 243 0.06% 0.13 % 0.48% 0.74% 1.02% 9.20% 1.05% 
RELSP2 243 0.00% 0.00 % 0.00% 0.02% 0.01% 0.85% 0.08% 
LNVOLUME 243 9.79 13.64 15.52 15.45 17.26 20.53 2.66 
RES-SIZE/RELSP 243 -3.107 -0.957 -0.122 0.000 0.675 6.319 1.436 
RES-SIZE/LNVOL 243 -3.160 -0.667 -0.022 0.000 0.634 3.254 0.970 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the sample data 
As one can see from the above table 4, the P/E ratio range is from 13.53 to 24.43 (15.65) 
based on the lower quartile and upper quartile. Earnings-per-share growth rate varies be-
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study: OMX HEL, OMX 
STO, OMX CPH = 588 com-
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on data availability; 243 




tween -4.2% and 37.9% (25.4%-56.0%) based on the lower and upper quartile. It is re-
markable that the beta ranges between 0.57 and 1.06 (0.36), however with a significant 
standard deviation. Based on the sample data, the market capitalization range is from 
199.8 million euro to 2,935.7 million euro (9,967.1) based on the lower quartile and upper 
quartile. However, the standard deviation in market capitalization is almost 10 billion 
euro. The interest in this study is in the liquidity and its proxies. A liquidity proxy used 
in this study, the relative bid-ask spread, varies between 0.13% and 1.02% (1.05%) based 
on the lower quartile and upper quartile. However, the bid-ask spread can be material and 
the maximum bid-ask spread is more than 9%. It means that the liquidity has a significant 
impact on markets.  
5.4 Cross-sectional regressions and hypotheses 
The first regression model R1 tests how the relative bid-ask spread works as a proxy for 
liquidity. The regression model is following 
P/E = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2016𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2017𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4
× 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
(R1) 
where 𝛼𝛼0 is the intercept, 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 is the coeffient and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error term for the firm i. The 
hypothesis for this regression is that the coefficient for RELSP should be negative since 
lower liquidity should reduce the firm value. The regression model is used by Loderer 
and Roth (2005) also.  
The second regression model the P/E ratio is converted to a natural logarithm and the 
White heteroscedasticity-consistent standards errors and covariance are applied. Thus, the 
regression model is unlinear and the RELSP2 is eliminated from the model. The 
regression model is following 
ln (P/E)𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2016𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2017𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3
× 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝
+ 𝛼𝛼5 × 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 + 𝛼𝛼6 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
(R2) 
In this model the focus is to test whether all the factors are statistically significant. Espe-
cially, the statistically significance of RELSP is highly interested. As the correlation be-
tween the relative bid-ask spread and the market capitalization is -0.232 (not shown), it 
can be seen that the market capitalization is a measure of both risk and liquidity of a share. 
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This result means that the larger companies have tighter relative bid-ask spread. Thus, the 
size of the company can be seen as a proxy for liquidity also. (Loderer & Roth 2005)  
As the correlation between the relative bid-ask spread and the market capitalization 
indicates that the market capitalization measures risk and liquidity of the share, it is 
needed to separate the possible risk and liquidity effects in the coefficient of LNSIZE in 
the regression model R2. The unraveling of these two effects is done by regression the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization on relative bid-ask spread. (Loderer & Roth 
2005.) The regression (R3) is used to disentangle the effects 
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇0 + 𝜇𝜇1 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 , (R3) 
where i is the firm in question and η is an error term. According to Loderer and Roth 
(2005), this regression tells which part of the cross-sectional variation in market capitali-
zation is due to the cross-sectional variation in liquidity. Moreover, by construction, the 
residuals from the regression model R3 are unrelated to liquidity since the relative bid-
ask spread works as a proxy for liquidity of the share. Thus, the residuals capture the size 
effects without liquidity effects. (Loderer & Roth 2005.) The residuals from the model 
R3 are called RES-SIZE/RELSP and the residuals are used instead of LNSIZE in this 
study. Hence, the next regression model R4 used in this study is following 
ln (P/E)𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2016𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2017𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 × 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 + 𝛼𝛼5 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸/𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝛼6 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
(R4) 
However, if all the factors are not statistically significant in the regression model R2, then 
the insignificant factor is removed from the regression model and the regression is per-
formed again. In the regression model R4, White heteroscedasticity-consistent standards 
errors and covariance are applied. The main hypothesis in this regression model is that 
the coefficient of RES-SIZE/RELSP is positive and the coefficient of Beta is negative. A 
positive coefficient of RES-SIZE/RELSP implies that the equity beta does not capture all 
the risk of the company and the size can include risk which is not measured by the beta. 
Thus, the less risky large companies have higher valuation based on the assumptions of a 
positive RES-SIZE/RELSP coefficient and a negative Beta coefficient. (Loderer & Roth 
2005.) The robust regression is applied also for the regression model R4 if needed as 
Loderer and Roth have done in their paper.   
Furthermore, instead of the relative bid-ask spread, the natural logarithm of average 
value of daily trading volume is used as a proxy for liquidity. Thus, the regressiol model 
R3 is modified as follows 
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𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇0 + 𝜇𝜇1 × 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 , (R3.2) 
where the residuals are called RES-SIZE/LNVOL. Hence, the regression model R4 is 
written as follows   
ln (P/E)𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2016𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2017𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3
× 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝
+ 𝛼𝛼5 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸/𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼6 × 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. 
(R4.2) 
However, if some of the coefficient is statistically insignificant in the regression model 
R2, it would be removed from the regression model R4.2 as Loderer and Roth (2005) 
have done.  
Moreover, one regression model is used in addition to models used by Loderer and 
Roth (2005). The fifth regression model R5 is following 
ln (P/E)𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2016𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔2017𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 × 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝
+ 𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
(R5) 
and White heteroscedasticity-consistent standards errors and covariance are applied. The 
hypothesis is that the coefficient of LNSIZE is positive and the coefficient of Beta is 
negative. The coefficient of LNSIZE is used to derive a pricing discount for perfectly 
liquid equity value. This regression model is based on the course material of Advanced 
Valuation at the University of Bern in the spring 2015 by Zeller. There the problem is 
that the bid-ask spreads are not available for unlisted firms. Hence, the firm size is used 
as a proxy for bid-ask spreads. According to Zeller’s material, the P/E ratio can be pre-
dicted for a given firm named “Company” and for the benchmark firm named “Bench-
mark” and compute the illiquidity discount as follows 
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𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝�𝛼𝛼0� + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝚥𝚥� × 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼𝛼4� × 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶3𝑗𝑗=1 �




𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝�𝛼𝛼0� + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝚥𝚥� × 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶] × exp [𝛼𝛼4� × 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶3𝑗𝑗=1 �
𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝�𝛼𝛼0� + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝚥𝚥� × 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚] × exp [𝛼𝛼4� × 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑗𝑗=1 �
. 
(39) 
Following it is assumed that the “Company” and the “Benchmark” is assumed to be iden-

















Hence, the illiquidity discount can be presented as follows 






where 𝛼𝛼4� is the estimated coefficient of LNSIZE. However, the market capitalization of 
the company in question is unknown since the market’s discount for limited liquidity is 
not taken into account. The equation for illiquid value of equity is following (Zeller 2015) 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 = 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 × (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹). (42) 
Hence, the equation 41 can be modified as follows (Zeller 2015) 








The equation 43 is used to derive an illiquid discount range for perfectly liquid equity 
value. 
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5.5 Econometrics concerns 
There are a few possible concerns related to econometric methods in this study. First, it 
is possible that the used data is not suitable for this study for various reasons, for example, 
the relative bid-ask spread is not a good liquidity proxy or there is no price-liquidity re-
lation. However, in the terms of econometrics concerns, the biggest issue is the multicol-
linearity in the sample and it will be investigated. In addition to that, the residuals can be 
skewed in the regression models. The normality of the residuals will be tested by using 
different diagnostic analyses.  
The White heteroscedasticity-consistent standards errors and covariance are applied 
due to possible heteroscedasticity of error terms, i.e. the variance is not the same across 
all observation points. Moreover, a method of robust regression will be applied. In this 
study, the M-estimation robust regression introduced by Huber (1964) is used. M-estima-
tion is suitable to use if the error distribution is not normal and especially when the errors 
are heavy-tailed (Fox 2002). In general, the problem with the abnormal residuals is that 
they are inconsistent with the t- and F-tests (Loderer & Roth 2005). In this study, this 
procedure is used to compute regression coefficients of the regression models R4 and 
R4.2.  
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section of the study presents the regression results for all the regression models pre-
sented in the chapter 5. Moreover, the economic concerns related to regression models 
are studied. After that, the results will be interpreted and discussed. 
6.1 Regression results 
The first regression model R1 tests whether the bid-ask spread works as a proxy for il-
liquidity at all. Table 5 presents the main observations related to the R1. 
Variable Regression coefficient t-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 16.8598 12.6888 0.0000 
EPSg2016 12.8480 8.7356 0.0000 
EPSg2017 21.4818 6.5509 0.0000 
RELSP -394.7084 -2.2817 0.0234 
RELSP2 5,122.3930 2.2481 0.0255 
Number of observations 243   
F-statistics (p-value) 31.4978 (0.000)   
R-squared 0.3461   
Adjusted R-squared 0.3351   
Table 5 Regression results from R1 
All the coefficients in table 5 are statistically significant with the confidence level of 0.95. 
The F-test measures the significance of regression coefficients as a whole. The null hy-
pothesis is that all independent variables have coefficient of zero, i.e. a linear regression 
is not suited. A counterhypothesis is that at least one of the coefficients is significantly 
different from zero, i.e. linear regression model is suited. In this case, the F-statistics is 
significantly high and the linear regression seems to be able to use. The R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared are close to each other, 0.35. Therefore, this estimated relation ex-
plains 35% of the cross-sectional variation in P/E ratios. Compared this to Loderer & 
Roth’s results (86.5%), this is relative low value but still useful. 
Both of the earnings-per-share growth coefficients are positive and significant with the 
confidence level of 0.95. It is obvious that the higher EPS results higher P/E ratio, i.e. in 
this case higher valuation. The coefficient for relative bid-ask spread is negative and its 
squared version has a positive coefficient, and both are significant with the confidence 
level of 0.95. As Loderer & Roth (2005) estimated that a marginal 1% increase in the bid-
ask spread decreases P/E ratio by 12, the corresponding decrease in this study is -3.44 (-
394.7084*0.01+5,122.393*0.012 ≈ -3.44). 
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However, the resulted residuals from the regression model R1 are not normally dis-
tributed and this can question tests in table 5. The figure 3 represents the residual distri-
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Figure 3 Residuals from the regression R1  
Skewness and Kurtosis of the distribution presented in the figure 3 are 4.96 and 47.11, 
respectively. By taking a natural logarithm from the P/E ratio, the residuals are more 
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Figure 4 Residuals from the regression R1 with the natural logarithm of P/E ratio 
As one can observe, the residuals are much normally distributed with the natural loga-
rithm of P/E ratio. Skewness and Kurtosis of the distribution presented in the figure 4 are 
0.24 and 3.68, respectively. 
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Due to above-mentioned reasons, the second regression model is applied. Table 6 pre-
sents results related to R2.  
Variable Regression coefficient t-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 1.0578 2.3352 0.0204 
EPSg2016 0.5152 7.3695 0.0000 
EPSg2017 0.8684 5.2066 0.0000 
Payout ratio 0.0710 1.0235 0.3071 
Beta -0.1904 -2.5180 0.0125 
LNSIZE 0.0803 3.7503 0.0002 
RELSP 3.9499 2.3352 0.2223 
Number of observations 243   
F-statistics (p-value) 34.2792 (0.000)   
R-squared 0.4657   
Adjusted R-squared 0.4521   
Table 6 Regression results from R2 
The regression intercept has a positive and significant coefficient as before. Moreover, 
coefficients for estimated EPS growth rates remain positive and significant. However, 
payout ratio’s coefficient is close to zero with insignificant value. This is the same obser-
vation as Loderer & Roth (2005) had. Moreover, Penman (2010) also states that the pay-
out ratio is irrelevant in valuation purposes. The coefficient of Beta is negative and sig-
nificant. This implies that the beta is a relevant measure for risk. The coefficient of 
LNSIZE is significant and a positive value. It can be seen that larger companies have 
higher valuation due to lower risk (Loderer & Roth 2005). 
However, the coefficient of RELSP is insignificantly different from zero. This result 
is consistent with the study of Loderer and Roth (2005). They suggested two reasons for 
that: there is no price-liquidity relation or LNSIZE measure both risk and liquidity. The 
negative correlation between market capitalization and relative bid-ask spread (presented 
above; -0.232) supports this second reason (Loderer & Roth 2005). In conclusion, the 
results from R2 interpret that the larger companies have higher valuation than small com-
panies. Since the purpose in this study is to estimate the limited liquidity discount on 
value, the possible LNSIZE effects should be disentangled, i.e. how much it measures 
risk and how much liquidity. Therefore, the regression R3 is applied. Table 7 presents 
results from the R3.  
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Variable Regression coefficient t-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 21.36305 189.2705 0.0000 
RELSP -110.4989 -12.5051 0.0000 
Number of observations 243   
F-statistics (p-value) 156.3780 (0.000)   
R-squared 0.3935   
Adjusted R-squared 0.3910   
Table 7 Regression results from R3 
Both coefficients are significant and the F-test result is high. The adjusted R-squared is 
39.1%. The residuals from this regression are used in the regression model R4 where the 
liquidity-related size effects are tried to distinguish from the liquidity-unrelated size ef-
fects. Table 8 presents the results from the regression model R4. 
Variable Regression coefficient t-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 2.8137 36.1227 0.0000 
EPSg2016 0.5403 9.1606 0.0000 
EPSg2017 0.8926 5.5537 0.0000 
Beta -0.1972 -2.6304 0.0091 
RES-SIZE/RELSP 0.0835 3.9421 0.0001 
RELSP -5.388 -1.9775 0.0491 
Number of observations 243   
F-statistics (p-value) 40.4874 (0.000)   
R-squared 0.4629   
Adjusted R-squared 0.4515   
Table 8 Regression results from R4 
At first, one should note that the payout ratio is eliminated from the regression model 
since its coefficient was insignificant in the R2. The (adjusted) R-squared is more or less 
the same as in the R2 and all of the coefficients are significantly different from zero with 
the confidence level of 0.95. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients remain the same as 
in the R2 except the coefficient of relative spread is now negative. Especially, the coeffi-
cient of RES-SIZE/RELSP is positive and implies that the equity beta does not take into 
account all the size aspects of risk (Loderer & Roth 2005). According to Loderer and 
Roth (2005), a positive sign there means that larger companies are less risky and the val-
uation is higher, all else being the same compared to smaller companies. In addition, table 
8 shows that the coefficient of relative bid-ask spread, RELSP, has a negative sign which 
is one of the most important results in this study. It means that a larger bid-ask spread 
reduces the equity value. 
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However, the residuals from the regression R4 are not normally distributed as shown 
in the figure 5. Therefore, the results from t- and F-tests are not reliable. The remedy for 









-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 
Figure 5 Residuals from the regression R4 
As the figure 5 presents, the residuals are right-skewed. Skewness and Kurtosis of the 
distribution presented in the figure 5 are 0.17 and 3.86, respectively. Moreover, the figure 
6 depicts the normal Q-Q plot of the R4. 
 
Figure 6 Normal Q-Q plot of the regression R4 
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The diagnostic analysis reveals the fact of skewed residuals. Table 9 presents the results 
related to the M-estimated R4, i.e. the robust regression by Huber. 
Variable Regression coefficient z-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 2.7906 37.8425 0.0000 
EPSg2016 0.5333 11.8029 0.0000 
EPSg2017 0.9428 9.4537 0.0000 
Beta -0.1841 -2.5453 0.0109 
RES-SIZE/RELSP 0.0946 5.2843 0.0000 
RELSP -4.8512 -1.9798 0.0477 
Number of observations 243   
R-squared 0.3812   
Adjusted R-squared 0.3689   
Table 9 Regression results from M-estimated R4 
The regression coefficients have same signs as before and those are significantly different 
from zero with the confidence level of 0.95. 
One economic concern in this study is related to multicollinearity when the regression 
model includes multiple factors. The collinearity is a phenomenon in which two variables 
are highly correlated in the regression and the multicollinearity occurs if there are more 
than two correlated variables. However, almost always there is some correlation between 
variables and it is not a problem. If the correlation between variables is strong, the multi-
collinearity might be a problem. In general, one should check the multicollinearity of 
variables if R-squared is high but coefficients of variables are not statistically significant. 
(Stock & Watson 2007, 206-210.) Table 10 presents the multicollinearity test for R4. 
 LN(P/E) EPSg2016 EPSg2017 Beta RES-SIZE/RELSP RELSP 
LN(P/E) 1.000 0.533 0.388 -0.184 0.045 -0.002 
EPSg2016 0.533 1.000 0.059 -0.168 -0.135 0.062 
EPSg2017 0.388 0.059 1.000 -0.085 -0.176 0.084 
Beta -0.184 -0.168 -0.085 1.000 0.177 -0.242 
RES-
SIZE/RELSP 
0.045 -0.135 -0.176 0.177 1.000 0.000 
RELSP -0.002 0.062 0.084 -0.242 0.000 1.000 
Table 10 Multicollinearity test for R4 (White procedure) 
Table 10 interprets that there is no multicollinearity between variables since the values 
are small, i.e. smaller than 0.6. Moreover, to test multicollinearity, variance inflation fac-
tors (VIF) are studied also. If the VIF values are close to one, it means that there is no 
multicollinearity. (Weisberg 2005, 216-217.) Table 11 presents the VIF values for R4.  
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Variable  Centered VIF  
EPSg2016  1.0759  
EPSg2017  1.1078  
Beta  1.2251  
RES-SIZE/RELSP  1.2382  
RELSP  1.1918  
Table 11 VIF values for R4 (White procedure) 
As one can observe, all the values are really close to one, i.e. there is no multicollinearity 
based on the VIF values and the multicollinearity matrix. 
6.1.1 Holdout samples 
In this chapter, the whole sample is divided into two holdout samples and it will be tested 
whether the results are same as before. First, the whole sample is divided as follows: 
sample 1 includes 33 companies from OMX HEL, 71 OMX STO and 18 from OMX 
COP; sample 2 includes 33 companies from OMX HEL, 71 from OMX STO and 17 from 
OMX CPH. The regression R4 is used with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors and covariance. Table 12 presents the results 
Variable Regression coefficient t-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 2.6706 23.7529 0.0000 
EPSg2016 0.5425 7.3949 0.0000 
EPSg2017 0.8158 3.5639 0.0005 
Beta -0.0513 -0.4996 0.6183 
RES-SIZE/RELSP 0.0298 0.9630 0.3375 
RELSP -7.0351 -1.3418 0.1823 
Number of observations 122   
F-statistics (p-value) 19.7217 (0.000)   
R-squared 0.4595   
Adjusted R-squared 0.4362   
Table 12 Holdout sample 1 results from R4 
As one can observe, Beta, RES-SIZE/RELSP and RELSP coefficients are not statistically 
significant. This might be the result of a small sample size. Still all the signs are same as 
before. However, the table 13 presents the results regressed from the holdout sample 2.  
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Variable Regression coefficient t-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 2.9560 25.5856 0.0000 
EPSg2016 0.5357 5.4142 0.0000 
EPSg2017 0.9827 5.4548 0.0000 
Beta -0.3488 -2.9210 0.0042 
RES-SIZE/RELSP 0.1351 5.1293 0.0000 
RELSP -5.4365 -2.1543 0.0333 
Number of observations 121   
F-statistics (p-value) 24.3512 (0.000)   
R-squared 0.5143   
Adjusted R-squared 0.4931   
Table 13 Holdout sample 2 results from R4 
All the coefficients are significantly different from zero with the confidence level of 0.95. 
Moreover, the signs of coefficients are same as before. 
6.1.2 Regression model for private companies 
One regression model is used in addition to models used by Loderer and Roth (2005). 
The results from the fifth regression model R5 are presented in the table 14. 
Variable Regression coefficient t-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 1.3440 3.6308 0.0003 
EPSg2016 0.5377 9.1791 0.0000 
EPSg2017 0.8867 0.1585 0.0000 
Beta -0.2051 -2.7395 0.0066 
LNSIZE 0.0610 3.8602 0.0001 
Number of observations 243   
F-statistics (p-value) 50.6833 (0.000)   
R-squared 0.4600   
Adjusted R-squared 0.4509   
Table 14 Regression results from R5 
The (adjusted) R-squared is more or less same as before and all the signs remain as before. 
The coefficients are significantly different from zero with the confidence level of 0.95. 







 LN(P/E) EPSg2016 EPSg2017 Beta LNSIZE 
LN(P/E) 1.000 0.533 0.388 -0.184 0.037 
EPSg2016 0.533 1.000 0.059 -0.168 -0.144 
EPSg2017 0.388 0.059 1.000 -0.085 -0.190 
Beta -0.184 -0.168 -0.085 1.000 0.290 
LNSIZE 0.037 -0.144 -0.190 0.290 1.000 
Table 15 Multicollinearity test for R5 (White procedure) 
Table 15 interprets that there is no multicollinearity between variables since the values 
are pretty small, i.e. smaller than 0.6. Table 16 presents the VIF values for R5.  
Variable  Centered VIF  
EPSg2016   1.068986  
EPSg2017   1.100808  
Beta   1.218409  
LNSIZE   1.396057  
Table 16 VIF value for R5 (White procedure) 
As one can observe, all the values are really close to one, i.e. there is no multicollinearity 
based on the VIF values and the multicollinearity matrix. 
6.1.3 Trading volume as a liquidity proxy 
In addition to the bid-ask spread, the trading volume is used also as a liquidity proxy in 
this study, as Loderer & Roth (2005) did. Table 17 presents the results from the regression 
model R4.2. The RELSP is replaced with LNVOLUME and RES-SIZE/RELSP is now 
RES-SIZE/LNVOL, where residuals are as before. The R4.2 is regressed by using M-
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Figure 7 Residuals from the regression R4.2 without M-estimation 
Skewness and Kurtosis of the distribution presented in the figure 7 are 0.14 and 3.64, 
respectively. Table 17 presents the results from the M-estimated regression R4.2. 
Variable Regression coefficient z-Statistics p-values 
Intercept 2.0076 12.6251 0.0000 
EPSg2016 0.5277 11.4384 0.0000 
EPSg2017 0.9328 9.1499 0.0000 
Beta -0.2120 -2.8150 0.0049 
RES-SIZE/LNVOL 0.0587 2.2388 0.0252 
LNVOLUME 0.0499 4.8134 0.0000 
Number of observations 243   
R-squared 0.3765   
Adjusted R-squared 0.3634   
Table 17 Regression results from M-estimated R4.2 
As it can be seen from the table 17 above, the beta still has a negative sign (i.e. beta 
measures risk) and LNVOLUME has a positive sign, i.e. higher volume increases the 
company value. All the coefficients are statistically significant with the confidence level 
of 0.95.  
Table 18 presents the multicollinearity matrix from the regression R4.2 where 





LN(P/E) EPSg2016 EPSg2017 Beta 
RES-
SIZE/LNVOL LNVOLUME 
LN(P/E) 1.000 0.533 0.388 -0.184 0.005 0.041 
EPSg2016 0.533 1.000 0.059 -0.168 -0.067 -0.128 
EPSg2017 0.388 0.059 1.000 -0.085 -0.052 -0.191 
Beta -0.184 -0.168 -0.085 1.000 -0.019 0.352 
RES-SIZE/LNVOL 0.005 -0.067 -0.052 -0.019 1.000 0.000 
LNVOLUME 0.041 -0.128 -0.191 0.352 0.000 1.000 
Table 18 Multicollinearity test for R4.2 
Table 18 interprets that there is no multicollinearity between variables since the values 
are pretty small, i.e. smaller than 0.6. 
6.2 Practical implications 
In this chapter, the above results are interpreted into practice. The liquidity discount for 
the 10 most liquid shares and less liquid shares in the sample are presented in the appendix 
2. Note that the size variable is presented in euros. The liquidity discount for the firm i is 
calculated following 
𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 1 − exp (−4.8512 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖), (44) 
where -4.8512 is the regression coefficient of M-estimated R4 for the relative bid-ask 
spread and RELSP is the relative bid-ask spread for the firm i (Loderer & Roth 2005). 









RELSP 243 0.06% 0.13% 0.48% 0.74% 1.02% 9.20% 1.05% 
Liquidity discount relative to a situation of perfect liquidity 
  0.3% 0.6% 2.3% 3.5% 4.8% 36.0%  
Table 19 Liquidity discount relative to a situation of perfect liquidity 
As the table 19 above presents, the liquidity discount varies from 0.3% to 36.0% in the 
sample, i.e. in the Nordic stock markets. Basically, it would be said that 0.3% reflects the 
transaction costs such as brokerage commissions. Moreover, 36.0% includes also the in-
direct effect of illiquidity. In conclusion, the most liquid firms sell at a 0.3% discount and 
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the least liquid firms sells at a 36.0% discount. Loderer and Roth (2005) found the liquid-
ity discount range of 1.6%-33.4%, respectively. They studied the Swiss stock markets.  
Moreover, the equation 43 is used to derive a pricing discount range for perfectly liquid 
equity value. The benchmark equity value is the lowest value of the 10 most liquid market 
capitalizations from the appendix 2. This discount range can be used in private company 
valuations where the perfectly liquid equity value is calculated as proposed in the valua-
tion section of this study. Based on coefficients of LNSIZE and RES-SIZE/RELSP from 
the R4 (White procedure), the discount range is presented in the table 20. 
Discount range















500,000,000 16.5% 19.6%  
Table 20 Illiquidity discount for private companies 
As one can see, the illiquidity discount is significant for private companies as previous 
literature has also stated. The discount range varies between 16.5%-65.3% for companies 
with the perfectly liquid equity value of 500,000,000€ and 50,000€, respectively. This 
means that if the equity value of the company in question is e.g. 1 million euro calculated 
without a small company risk premium or an illiquidity premium, therefore the pricing 
discount should be approximately 50%. In other words, an investor demands 50% dis-
count from the purely liquid equity value in order to have compensation of lack of liquid-
ity of an asset or a company in question. In this case, the investor would pay only 
500,000€ from the company’s equity and it corresponds a fair market equity value.  
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6.3 Interpretation and discussion 
The main research question in this study is: how much an investor demands discount from 
perfectly liquid equity value in the case of limited liquidity? The main research question 
contains two sub-questions as following 
• How to define a fair market equity value and what characteristics should be 
taken into account in its valuation? 
• How to measure limited liquidity in valuation? 
The fair market equity value can be calculated by using an income approach valuation or 
a market approach valuation. The income approach includes the discounted cash flow 
model as a main method, the residual earnings model and the abnormal earnings growth 
model. These models are based on projected cash flows, earnings and dividends over an 
explicit forecasting period. However, the cost of capital has significant impact on the 
valuation results. Therefore, the analysis of an appropriate weighted average cost of cap-
ital is needed in the valuation. The market approach covers trading and transaction mul-
tiple analysis where the peer group has significant impact on results.  
In short, the answer to the second sub-research question includes two main approaches 
to limited liquidity. First, the illiquidity premium in the cost of capital is highly used but 
also the illiquidity discount can be applied. In this study, the focus is on the illiquidity 
discount which reflects the difference between the purely liquid equity value and the il-
liquid equity value.  
The main research question is handled following. This study has shown that investors 
demand liquidity discount which ranges from 0.3% to 36.0% in the Nordic stock markets. 
The mean and the median discounts are 2.3% and 3.5%, respectively. With this infor-
mation different market participant and managers of companies can take into account 
liquidity of the company and can affect its costs in order to increase the share value, i.e. 
to maximize the shareholder value. For example, the results from this study can be used 
for valuation purposes. Corporate finance companies or departments that perform valua-
tions a lot can use the results of this study to add customer’s value and reflect on their 
professional valuation methods. Companies with limited liquidity can get valuable infor-
mation from this study to reduce the cost of capital by affecting liquidity of securities 
owned by the company. Thus, the companies can also maximize the shareholder value 
which is its main objective usually. Moreover, with management forecasts companies can 
increase liquidity and therefore increase the value of the company by reducing the bid-
ask spreads. 
Theoretically this study gives new information about liquidity proxies, especially in 
the Nordic markets. This study has confirmed that the relative bid-ask spread can work 
as a liquidity proxy but also the trading volume works as a liquidity proxy. The research 
gap in the Nordic markets is fulfilled with this study but the sample size is still limited 
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since the number of listed companies is relatively low. Moreover, this study deepens the 
knowledge of the Nordic stock markets liquidity in a whole new way and supports the 
results of previous studies. 
However, in this study the median and the mean illiquidity discounts are much smaller 
compared to the previous studies where the median discounts went up to 30% in many 
cases. I believe that the main reason for smaller median and mean discounts is more effi-
cient stock markets globally. During recent decades, the trading has been facilitated and 
the cost of trading has decreased significantly. Therefore, with the higher number of in-
vestors in the markets, liquidity increases and the discounts decrease. Moreover, the av-
erage of relative bid-ask spreads can vary between different stock exchanges and there-
fore, the stock exchanges with higher spreads have higher discounts (see the difference 
between the Swiss stock exchange and the NASDAQ in the study of Loderer & Roth 
(2005)). This also shows that there is not one specific liquidity discount for all the com-
panies. It is highly important to take into account the firm-specific characteristics and 
apply an appropriate discount for each company. Previous literature has focused on me-
dian and mean pricing discounts even though it would be more fruitful to look at the 
whole discount range.    
The deviation between results of previous studies is significant. For example, Loderer 
and Roth (2005) found that the median pricing discount for limited liquidity in the Swiss 
stock exchange was 6.4% in 1997 and 21.3% in 1999. Hence, the liquidity of the markets 
can vary across time substantially. Since my study does not cover the time aspect of lim-
ited liquidity, the results of my study can reflect the time of high liquid period of the 
markets. Still the difference between the lowest median discount (6.4% in 1997) from 
Loderer and Roth (2005) and my study (2.3%) is multifold. Thus, an assumption of more 
efficient markets is valid. 
The practical results from the regression model 5 show that the illiquidity discounts 
for private companies are still enormous, i.e. the investors demand high illiquidity dis-
counts for private companies. It can be believed that the number of private equity inves-
tors are still much more limited in comparison with investors who operate with the pub-
licly traded companies. Briefly, there are not enough buyers or sellers in the private equity 
markets and therefore, the illiquidity discounts increase. The results of my study support 
evidence of Paglio and Harjoto’s (2010) study where the discount for lack of marketabil-
ity was averagely 65%-70% and exceeded 80% in some sectors of the economy. There-
fore, one should question sizes of discounts resulted from restricted stock, IPO and ac-
quisition studies in valuation engagements for private companies. 
This study has shown that liquidity has significant impact on company valuation not 
only in the case of private companies but also for listed companies in the Nordic stock 
markets. However, liquidity increases if a share is listed on a stock exchange and there-
fore, the illiquidity discount is much smaller as it is observed from the results of this 
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study. For example, Kemira, a Finnish-based listed company with the market capitalisa-
tion of 1,610 million euro and the relative bid-ask spread of 0.15%, has an illiquidity 
discount of 0.7% based on the equation 44 and 8.9% if the company would not be listed 
on the stock exchange based on the equation 43. 
6.4 Evaluation and further research topics 
It is highly important that the results are reliable. To keep the methods open, the data set 
is shown in the appendices. However, the reliance of this study is a broad concept. First, 
to solve the research questions, the theoretical framework has been chosen to support the 
analyses of the empirical methods but also the empirical data is selected carefully from 
the available databases. Second, the reliance of the study is based on the considered and 
reasoned interpretation of the literature, methods and data. The literature related to this 
study is written and studied by well-known academic researchers and the journals are 
high classified academic research journals. Together the previous studies form a strong 
base for this study and therefore the plausibility of the results from this study can be 
believed to be correct and useful. Third, the results are tried to be presented in a logical 
order so that the interpretations stay also logical. 
In the following the plausibility of the study is discussed at a terminology level, con-
cerning the reliability, stability and validity of the study including internal, external and 
face validity. First, the reliability of the study seems to be quite strong. The signs of re-
gression coefficients remain the same and they are logically and statistically significant 
through the whole study. The repeatability is hard to test since the number of observations 
is limited but as seen before, one of the sample confirmed the results for the whole study 
but the other sample does not. The randomness increases when the number of observa-
tions is low and therefore, the results from the holdout samples are valid with discretion. 
Moreover, the results from this study concern the Nordic stocks markets, especially Fin-
land and Sweden where the number of observations are high. However, the capital market 
structures in the Nordics are quite similar and therefore the results can be reflected also 
to illiquidity effects in Denmark, Norway and Iceland. 
The stability of the measure of illiquidity is questionable in this study since Loderer 
and Roth (2005) have proved that the liquidity discount varies across time. Therefore, the 
results are valid only in the near future and should be updated when the market conditions 
change.  
The validity of the results is high. Previous literature and logical interpretations con-
firm that the liquidity discount range is measured as in this study and the results are sim-
ilar. The internal validity of the study is strong also since the results in the studied popu-
lation are plausible and reflect the population as a whole. However, since the population 
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is still quite limited, the external validity of the results is doubtful. Even if the results 
might be doubtful, the results reflect the best possible and available data and furthermore, 
studied population is two times larger than the population studied by Loderer & Roth 
(2005). The methods of this study are easy to test with other data from different markets 
and this supports the external validity of this study. Thus, the results can be seen also 
good to use in practice since better estimations are not available. The face validity of the 
results is strong since previous literature supports finding of this study. Moreover, based 
on own experience from capital markets and valuations, the illiquidity discount resulted 
from this study is consistent and equal with the discounts used before.  
Even if this study fulfilled one research gap, at the same time it opened other ones. It 
would be interesting to know how the illiquidity discount has varied across time in the 
Nordics and would it be possible to construct a method which takes into account the future 
expectations related to the illiquidity discount better. Moreover, from qualitative point of 
view it would be interesting to have some perspective on how much analysts and manag-
ers actually use this liquidity discount on own valuations and management decision-mak-
ing. It would be also valuable to research how the Finnish tax authority treats illiquidity 
premiums and illiquidity discounts in valuations that realize tax payments afterwards.    
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7 CONCLUSION 
This study researches the illiquidity effects on company valuation, i.e. the purpose of this 
study is to measure the pricing discount for limited liquidity by using cross-sectional re-
gression based on the observed market information from the Nordic stock markets. Earlier 
studies have found that the equity value is negatively correlated with the relative bid-ask 
spread and positively correlated with liquidity characteristics like the number of share-
holders, trading volume and the number of market makers trading the share. Moreover, 
there is evidence that illiquidity can explain differences in expected returns across shares 
and it has been proposed that over time expected illiquidity has a positive effect on ex-
pected stock returns. In corporate finance, liquidity and especially lack of liquidity, has 
substantial consequences for decision-making and valuation conclusions. In general, lim-
ited liquidity can reduce potential equity value more than 50%. Hence, limited liquidity 
can be seen as a critical element on corporate finance and financial markets overall. 
The illiquidity effects are studied by using different cross-sectional regression models, 
mostly based on Loderer and Roth’s (2005) methods. The models include regression ar-
guments for each particular firm. These arguments are expected rate of earnings growth, 
firm’s payout ratio, risk of the share, market value of the firm’s equity and share’s liquid-
ity. The regression model includes the firm size due to the evidence that risk-adjusted 
returns are affected by the size of the firm. In this study, the bid-ask spread is the main 
liquidity proxy based on its previous empirical evidences but also the trading volume is 
used as a liquidity proxy. The data is analyzed from OMX Helsinki, OMX Stockholm 
and OMX Copenhagen stock exchanges between 1 January 2013 and 30 June 2016. The 
sample includes 243 companies, 66 companies from Finland, 142 from Sweden and 35 
from Denmark.  
The theoretical framework of the study constructs of components of a valuation meth-
odology. First, the cost of capital is studied. Second, income approach valuation method-
ologies are studied and with these two components a roadmap to valuation is built. After 
that, the illiquidity effects are researched and taken into account in valuation. 
The main finding of this study is that the illiquidity discount in the Nordic stock mar-
kets varies between 0.3% and 36.0%. The most liquid shares sell at a 0.3% discount and 
the least liquid shares sell at a 36.0% discount compared with a purely liquid asset. The 
discount of 0.3% can reflect transaction costs such as brokerage commissions but the 
discount of 36.0% includes also price-impact liquidity costs. However, based on the lower 
quartile and upper quartile of the sample’s relative bid-ask spread, the illiquidity discount 
ranges between 0.6% and 4.8%. The mean illiquidity discount is 3.5% in the sample. In 
this study the range of the results is line with the previous studies even though the mean 
and median discounts are smaller. This can be seen as a result of developed financial 
markets. Moreover, this study shows that the illiquidity discount can be significant for 
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private companies. The discount range varies between 16.5% and 65.3% for private com-
panies with the perfectly liquid equity value of 500,000,000€ and 50,000€, respectively. 
In conclusion, the results of this study show that the market are more efficient nowa-
days based on a lower median illiquidity discount compared with the median discounts 
of previous studies. However, still liquidity plays an important role in company valuation 
and decision-making and the results of this study suggest that illiquidity should be taken 
into account, especially in company valuations in the Nordic environment. This study has 
also proved that the illiquidity discount would be smaller if a company was listed on a 
stock exchange, i.e. the risk of the company would be smaller due to increased liquidity 
and therefore the equity value would be higher. Managers could use this information to 
maximize the shareholder value.  
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RUTAV.HE 8.0 2.1 -14.6 % -20.0 % 48.8 % 0.31 43.0 17.6 0.96 % 0.01 % 10.4 -2.7282 -0.0215
AHL1V.HE 37.4 3.6 236.1 % -12.8 % 157.3 % 0.33 355.3 19.7 0.87 % 0.01 % 11.8 -0.7094 1.2664
VAIAS.HE 18.8 2.9 -4.4 % 31.6 % 63.1 % 0.54 368.6 19.7 0.89 % 0.01 % 12.2 -0.6571 1.0948
PKC1V.HE 75.2 4.3 264.3 % 48.0 % 311.0 % 1.04 378.3 19.8 0.30 % 0.00 % 13.6 -1.2749 0.2730
TLT1V.HE 13.9 2.6 8.1 % 13.1 % 37.7 % 0.43 161.0 18.9 0.91 % 0.01 % 11.1 -1.4634 0.8909
AKTRV.HE 12.6 2.5 5.8 % 0.6 % 69.2 % 0.14 214.2 19.2 5.53 % 0.31 % 9.9 3.9349 1.8770
NDA1V.HE 8.3 2.1 -9.8 % 6.4 % 70.4 % 0.87 35449.1 24.3 0.14 % 0.00 % 16.3 3.0831 3.2538
SRV1V.HE 16.1 2.8 -11.5 % 104.5 % 40.2 % 0.66 198.6 19.1 1.03 % 0.01 % 11.3 -1.1195 0.9799
KCR1V.HE 43.1 3.8 92.0 % 48.9 % 199.6 % 1.00 1347.8 21.0 0.11 % 0.00 % 15.5 -0.2201 0.4419
UNR1V.HE 27.5 3.3 26.8 % 37.9 % 85.3 % 1.47 971.5 20.7 0.30 % 0.00 % 13.9 -0.3366 1.0787
YTY1V.HE 17.3 2.9 -10.8 % 50.9 % 59.1 % 0.71 691.7 20.4 0.15 % 0.00 % 15.3 -0.8372 -0.0818
METSB.HE 11.6 2.4 -9.8 % 32.6 % 43.3 % 1.48 1759.5 21.3 0.37 % 0.00 % 14.3 0.3311 1.4180
LAT1V.HE 16.9 2.8 6.4 % 6.2 % 86.0 % 0.48 625.0 20.3 0.39 % 0.00 % 13.2 -0.6764 1.0150
RAP1V.HE 25.1 3.2 79.4 % 17.0 % 85.9 % 0.48 170.3 19.0 1.06 % 0.01 % 10.8 -1.2391 1.1498
INVEST.HE 5.2 1.7 -39.8 % 1.5 % 15.5 % 0.02 19.8 16.8 3.13 % 0.10 % 10.3 -1.1007 -0.7165
OKDBV.HE 16.3 2.8 4.5 % 7.4 % 51.9 % 0.38 527.6 20.1 0.73 % 0.01 % 12.9 -0.4699 1.0492
RMR1V.HE 19.0 2.9 18.5 % 15.0 % 110.6 % 0.80 665.8 20.3 0.29 % 0.00 % 13.9 -0.7277 0.6744
TPS1V.HE 9.3 2.2 31.0 % 0.0 % 44.5 % 0.82 390.1 19.8 0.55 % 0.00 % 13.0 -0.9713 0.6608
ATRAV.HE 18.2 2.9 67.4 % 16.2 % 81.6 % 0.98 164.7 18.9 0.63 % 0.00 % 11.7 -1.7477 0.5681
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AMEAS.HE 23.8 3.2 27.3 % 16.0 % 53.3 % 0.73 3006.2 21.8 0.11 % 0.00 % 15.5 0.5829 1.2692
ALN1V.HE 29.1 3.4 85.2 % 40.3 % 92.6 % 0.30 280.8 19.5 1.02 % 0.01 % 11.5 -0.7825 1.2309
KEMIRA.HE 22.9 3.1 44.0 % 23.0 % 113.8 % 0.88 1610.2 21.2 0.15 % 0.00 % 15.0 0.0019 0.9380
STERV.HE 7.0 1.9 -28.6 % 6.2 % 32.3 % 1.42 4613.1 22.3 0.10 % 0.00 % 17.0 1.0019 0.8095
AFE1V.HE 9.9 2.3 24.6 % 11.8 % 58.6 % 0.80 64.7 18.0 0.94 % 0.01 % 11.2 -2.3419 -0.0734
REG1V.HE 40.0 3.7 19.9 % 35.4 % 89.7 % 1.08 201.0 19.1 0.69 % 0.00 % 12.1 -1.4815 0.5492
SCL1V.HE 22.5 3.1 -9.6 % 184.6 % 55.6 % 1.22 211.1 19.2 1.47 % 0.02 % 11.0 -0.5742 1.2498
CGCBV.HE 16.5 2.8 18.5 % 8.4 % 36.2 % 1.60 1717.2 21.3 0.13 % 0.00 % 15.6 0.0453 0.6347
SDA1V.HE 4.9 1.6 -52.0 % -12.0 % 38.6 % 0.71 1266.4 21.0 0.33 % 0.00 % 14.3 -0.0403 1.1128
CRA1V.HE 16.5 2.8 30.6 % 10.9 % 57.9 % 0.98 814.7 20.5 0.24 % 0.00 % 14.3 -0.5843 0.6324
AFAGR.HE 13.2 2.6 -3.4 % 0.0 % 64.4 % 0.07 110.8 18.5 2.66 % 0.07 % 10.5 0.1037 0.8912
ETT1V.HE 15.3 2.7 12.9 % 18.6 % 48.4 % 0.55 109.4 18.5 1.28 % 0.02 % 10.8 -1.4336 0.6945
UPM1V.HE 9.6 2.3 -16.2 % -3.2 % 43.7 % 1.61 8513.6 22.9 0.10 % 0.00 % 17.1 1.6073 1.3605
OLVAS.HE 23.5 3.2 34.8 % 16.9 % 65.1 % 0.28 409.9 19.8 0.58 % 0.00 % 12.2 -0.8902 1.1799
NESTE.HE 14.7 2.7 24.3 % -10.6 % 45.8 % 1.18 7398.0 22.7 0.10 % 0.00 % 16.7 1.4677 1.4604
PON1V.HE 15.5 2.7 6.0 % 7.2 % 37.3 % 0.85 565.3 20.2 0.66 % 0.00 % 12.1 -0.4769 1.5662
ELISA.HE 22.6 3.1 6.0 % 5.7 % 91.8 % 0.59 5551.7 22.4 0.10 % 0.00 % 16.2 1.1813 1.4533
RAIVV.HE 17.4 2.9 15.6 % 2.9 % 71.8 % 0.31 548.4 20.1 0.51 % 0.00 % 13.0 -0.6720 1.0010
CTY1S.HE 14.6 2.7 37.5 % -8.9 % 53.6 % 0.97 1944.3 21.4 0.41 % 0.00 % 14.0 0.4782 1.6909
MEO1V.HE 7.1 2.0 -64.0 % 13.6 % 35.6 % 1.23 3075.3 21.8 0.08 % 0.00 % 16.7 0.5685 0.5847
TELIA1.HE 21.2 3.1 48.8 % 11.2 % 164.9 % 0.67 18376.9 23.6 0.17 % 0.00 % 15.5 2.4541 3.0509
ORNBV.HE 23.5 3.2 0.0 % 2.0 % 87.9 % 0.66 3148.2 21.9 0.10 % 0.00 % 15.8 0.6137 1.1097
SIILI.HE 18.1 2.9 43.9 % 18.6 % 56.9 % 0.49 52.7 17.8 1.60 % 0.03 % 11.0 -1.8134 -0.1241
FIS1V.HE 15.7 2.8 -50.4 % 60.2 % 67.4 % 0.30 1406.0 21.1 0.40 % 0.00 % 12.9 0.1454 2.0385
CTL1V.HE 43.4 3.8 77.6 % 27.3 % 72.7 % 0.60 167.9 18.9 1.68 % 0.03 % 11.8 -0.5714 0.5567
ASPO.HE 9.9 2.3 -21.8 % 21.1 % 63.3 % 0.84 213.7 19.2 0.52 % 0.00 % 11.6 -1.6045 0.8839
TIE1V.HE 19.9 3.0 17.5 % 7.1 % 109.7 % 0.63 1760.8 21.3 0.16 % 0.00 % 14.7 0.1020 1.1597
WRT1V.HE 17.1 2.8 5.2 % 8.6 % 56.1 % 0.56 7549.1 22.7 0.07 % 0.00 % 16.7 1.4637 1.4794
NRE1V.HE 17.8 2.9 -0.7 % 9.3 % 83.3 % 1.24 4192.6 22.2 0.07 % 0.00 % 16.8 0.8756 0.7799
HUH1V.HE 26.0 3.3 33.5 % 6.4 % 46.2 % 1.09 3612.3 22.0 0.13 % 0.00 % 15.4 0.7932 1.4833
EQV1V.HE 19.7 3.0 24.5 % 8.5 % 105.2 % 0.76 215.2 19.2 1.36 % 0.02 % 11.3 -0.6749 1.0672
SUY1V.HE 13.4 2.6 20.0 % 11.1 % 33.3 % 0.82 224.9 19.2 1.72 % 0.03 % 12.3 -0.2291 0.5357
PNA1V.HE 41.3 3.7 288.9 % 25.0 % 243.1 % 0.60 46.0 17.6 1.76 % 0.03 % 10.0 -1.7722 0.3334
KESBV.HE 37.2 3.6 71.6 % 19.5 % 243.9 % 0.65 2460.1 21.6 0.09 % 0.00 % 15.7 0.3627 0.9316
KNEBV.HE 20.6 3.0 -4.6 % 3.6 % 69.9 % 0.86 18042.0 23.6 0.07 % 0.00 % 17.3 2.3300 1.9643
MARAS.HE 10.3 2.3 27.9 % 23.1 % 41.0 % 0.11 19.0 16.8 1.44 % 0.02 % 9.8 -3.0139 -0.4478
FSC1V.HE 34.5 3.5 3.3 % 41.7 % 154.9 % 0.61 409.5 19.8 0.82 % 0.01 % 13.0 -0.6306 0.7477
IFA1V.HE 17.3 2.8 26.3 % 33.3 % 0.0 % 1.02 29.8 17.2 1.66 % 0.03 % 10.6 -2.3207 -0.4653















LEM1S.HE 41.9 3.7 209.2 % 47.9 % 38.7 % 0.51 310.9 19.6 1.14 % 0.01 % 11.4 -0.5517 1.3760
EXL1V.HE 20.5 3.0 -20.5 % 100.0 % 92.0 % 0.43 70.0 18.1 1.44 % 0.02 % 11.4 -1.7046 -0.1100
CPMBV.HE 17.1 2.8 46.6 % 5.9 % 120.7 % 0.48 76.9 18.2 1.24 % 0.02 % 11.2 -1.8370 0.0966
TIK1V.HE 17.3 2.9 5.5 % 10.1 % 85.1 % 1.01 679.7 20.3 0.33 % 0.00 % 13.6 -0.6617 0.8487
MMO1V.HE 71.8 4.3 175.4 % 65.6 % 352.6 % 0.29 62.9 18.0 1.20 % 0.01 % 10.7 -2.0801 0.2132
ILK2S.HE 13.8 2.6 99.2 % 46.4 % 71.2 % 0.20 43.3 17.6 1.13 % 0.01 % 10.2 -2.5258 0.1077
FIA1S.HE 13.9 2.6 177.8 % 3.3 % 0.0 % 0.77 655.2 20.3 0.69 % 0.00 % 12.7 -0.2961 1.3649
FINGb.ST 32.0 3.5 192.4 % 3.9 % 0.0 % 0.47 3219.1 21.9 0.39 % 0.00 % 19.8 0.9548 -1.2241
SCAb.ST 26.4 3.3 24.4 % 10.8 % 57.7 % 0.84 17304.3 23.6 0.07 % 0.00 % 19.7 2.2921 0.4936
MYCR.ST 13.6 2.6 -33.3 % 46.6 % 88.5 % 1.64 713.4 20.4 0.65 % 0.00 % 16.3 -0.2568 -0.6550
ARP.ST 12.5 2.5 42.5 % 32.1 % 0.0 % 0.89 69.2 18.1 2.64 % 0.07 % 11.7 -0.3933 -0.3156
HOLMb.ST 39.6 3.7 130.0 % 17.9 % 157.8 % 0.82 1734.0 21.3 0.09 % 0.00 % 17.3 0.0152 -0.3935
BEIAb.ST 15.8 2.8 -6.2 % 10.4 % 80.9 % 1.25 568.7 20.2 0.66 % 0.00 % 14.7 -0.4707 0.0367
FAG.ST 23.6 3.2 19.6 % 11.8 % 45.9 % 0.71 698.3 20.4 1.42 % 0.02 % 13.8 0.5708 0.8079
ELOSSb.ST 34.7 3.5 103.2 % 54.9 % 37.6 % 0.72 53.3 17.8 1.49 % 0.02 % 12.9 -1.9233 -1.2728
SWECb.ST 33.3 3.5 40.1 % 29.6 % 81.6 % 0.78 1536.9 21.2 0.68 % 0.00 % 15.4 0.5364 0.6278
BORG.ST 17.8 2.9 18.0 % 44.0 % 0.0 % 0.99 82.0 18.2 0.89 % 0.01 % 14.3 -2.1581 -1.6270
SAS.ST 9.7 2.3 139.7 % -15.0 % 0.0 % 0.72 798.7 20.5 0.58 % 0.00 % 16.7 -0.2289 -0.8084
IFSb.ST 42.1 3.7 75.2 % 23.2 % 38.0 % 0.98 941.3 20.7 0.59 % 0.00 % 16.4 -0.0505 -0.4449
BIOGb.ST 28.1 3.3 -2.5 % 10.3 % 62.9 % 0.73 394.4 19.8 0.60 % 0.00 % 15.3 -0.9114 -0.6785
SWOLb.ST 32.7 3.5 125.9 % 44.2 % 68.1 % 0.34 117.4 18.6 1.31 % 0.02 % 13.5 -1.3299 -0.8262
VICPA.ST 3.4 1.2 -83.2 % 12.5 % 3.6 % 0.83 143.8 18.8 1.53 % 0.02 % 13.9 -0.8869 -0.8693
NEWAb.ST 16.9 2.8 54.1 % 32.0 % 46.2 % 1.69 173.6 19.0 0.62 % 0.00 % 15.0 -1.7019 -1.3246
BEIJb.ST 22.1 3.1 11.8 % 13.4 % 60.8 % 0.76 816.1 20.5 1.18 % 0.01 % 14.6 0.4628 0.4753
GHP.ST 24.1 3.2 18.4 % 40.5 % 45.5 % 0.33 58.7 17.9 1.87 % 0.04 % 13.1 -1.4046 -1.2655
NDA.ST 8.3 2.1 -8.1 % 4.9 % 70.4 % 1.12 35440.9 24.3 0.08 % 0.00 % 20.4 3.0168 0.7924
SEBa.ST 9.5 2.2 -33.8 % 51.3 % 69.8 % 0.86 18734.9 23.7 0.08 % 0.00 % 20.0 2.3802 0.4207
SHBb.ST 12.6 2.5 -2.4 % 2.7 % 73.0 % 1.08 420.9 19.9 0.26 % 0.00 % 15.6 -1.2138 -0.7800
ANODb.ST 15.7 2.8 -14.6 % 17.0 % 70.7 % 0.74 171.4 19.0 1.52 % 0.02 % 13.2 -0.7207 -0.2748
FPAR.ST 5.6 1.7 -34.6 % -34.9 % 16.6 % 1.03 769.2 20.5 1.34 % 0.02 % 13.9 0.5823 0.8022
AFb.ST 18.0 2.9 10.3 % 6.4 % 49.1 % 0.74 1131.7 20.8 0.40 % 0.00 % 16.3 -0.0689 -0.2095
ARCM.ST 171.8 5.1 105.1 % 71.2 % 0.0 % 0.58 401.1 19.8 0.51 % 0.00 % 17.0 -0.9892 -1.6321
TRELb.ST 18.8 2.9 198.7 % -53.6 % 51.8 % 1.32 3920.8 22.1 0.10 % 0.00 % 18.6 0.8388 -0.3202
VITb.ST 23.5 3.2 -0.8 % 9.9 % 33.8 % 0.72 176.6 19.0 0.94 % 0.01 % 13.7 -1.3393 -0.5556
SYSR.ST 16.7 2.8 -29.7 % 25.6 % 33.6 % 0.77 577.9 20.2 0.76 % 0.01 % 14.7 -0.3535 0.0778
ITABb.ST 20.1 3.0 0.6 % 10.4 % 49.4 % 1.54 692.1 20.4 0.86 % 0.01 % 14.9 -0.0597 0.1500
AZN.ST 26.2 3.3 -14.4 % 0.2 % 125.4 % 0.58 66920.4 24.9 0.08 % 0.00 % 19.5 3.6492 2.0071
SHBa.ST 12.1 2.5 -3.9 % 0.2 % 73.0 % 0.90 21506.6 23.8 0.07 % 0.00 % 19.8 2.5034 0.6791
KLOVa.ST 5.1 1.6 -9.9 % -39.5 % 19.1 % 1.11 77.2 18.2 0.63 % 0.00 % 15.6 -2.5095 -2.4769
UNIBsdb.ST 25.4 3.2 38.2 % 10.3 % 98.2 % 0.27 2304.6 21.6 0.27 % 0.00 % 17.5 0.4989 -0.2165
AVANZ.ST 22.4 3.1 -3.5 % 15.8 % 74.5 % 1.24 1054.6 20.8 0.39 % 0.00 % 16.3 -0.1572 -0.2950
HEXAb.ST 23.4 3.2 15.5 % 9.4 % 31.0 % 1.08 11250.2 23.1 0.08 % 0.00 % 18.8 1.8719 0.5903
SWECa.ST 34.6 3.5 40.1 % 29.6 % 81.6 % 0.44 149.9 18.8 4.78 % 0.23 % 11.1 2.7405 0.8483
CONIC.ST 14.6 2.7 -9.4 % 11.1 % 50.5 % 1.51 424.9 19.9 0.61 % 0.00 % 15.7 -0.8227 -0.8144
LAGRb.ST 26.2 3.3 20.2 % 8.5 % 50.2 % 1.00 526.8 20.1 0.84 % 0.01 % 14.4 -0.3497 0.1270
ORIFL.ST 36.6 3.6 83.3 % 20.4 % 64.2 % 1.08 903.7 20.6 0.26 % 0.00 % 17.3 -0.4501 -1.0101
SECTb.ST 36.4 3.6 -1.5 % 12.4 % 0.0 % 1.20 414.7 19.8 1.07 % 0.01 % 14.0 -0.3389 0.1215
UFLXb.ST 11.6 2.5 88.6 % -3.7 % 96.5 % 0.18 31.6 17.3 2.12 % 0.05 % 12.8 -1.7482 -1.7408
SAGAa.ST 8.0 2.1 -41.3 % 1.4 % 11.7 % 1.19 102.3 18.4 2.35 % 0.06 % 12.6 -0.3174 -0.4076
AVEGb.ST 11.2 2.4 46.5 % -13.8 % 67.7 % 0.16 20.8 16.9 1.27 % 0.02 % 12.9 -3.1073 -2.1830
RATOb.ST 30.9 3.4 192.3 % 3.4 % 251.0 % 0.75 1197.5 20.9 0.13 % 0.00 % 17.5 -0.3136 -0.8715
HIQ.ST 18.1 2.9 12.8 % 6.8 % 0.0 % 0.32 276.0 19.4 0.54 % 0.00 % 15.0 -1.3310 -0.8758
DUNI.ST 14.3 2.7 -1.3 % 10.7 % 67.9 % 0.42 617.3 20.2 0.53 % 0.00 % 15.3 -0.5379 -0.2509
LUC.ST 13.0 2.6 81.8 % -43.4 % 14.1 % 1.19 763.5 20.5 0.66 % 0.00 % 15.9 -0.1813 -0.3816
ADDTb.ST 22.1 3.1 9.8 % 4.2 % 68.8 % 1.05 772.7 20.5 0.68 % 0.00 % 15.3 -0.1505 -0.0205
NNb.ST 12.4 2.5 -16.5 % 23.0 % 63.6 % 1.04 588.6 20.2 0.63 % 0.00 % 15.5 -0.4770 -0.3991
SKISb.ST 19.6 3.0 24.8 % -1.9 % 63.1 % 0.04 473.2 20.0 0.59 % 0.00 % 14.9 -0.7343 -0.2368
ALIVsdb.ST 20.2 3.0 29.2 % 12.4 % 43.3 % 1.02 7091.1 22.7 0.11 % 0.00 % 19.0 1.4373 0.0042
ELUXb.ST 41.2 3.7 173.4 % 13.1 % 119.9 % 1.08 6736.8 22.6 0.07 % 0.00 % 19.5 1.3439 -0.3426
KNOW.ST 12.9 2.6 34.2 % 7.9 % 70.9 % 0.46 120.9 18.6 0.99 % 0.01 % 14.3 -1.6592 -1.2578
BBTOb.ST 15.4 2.7 18.4 % 0.4 % 36.8 % 0.79 434.1 19.9 0.62 % 0.00 % 15.4 -0.7900 -0.6377
NCCb.ST 15.6 2.7 62.4 % -21.9 % 24.6 % 0.75 1865.1 21.3 0.09 % 0.00 % 18.2 0.0812 -0.8383
SKAb.ST 14.9 2.7 6.3 % -0.6 % 65.0 % 1.09 7449.3 22.7 0.09 % 0.00 % 19.1 1.4663 0.0112
LIAB.ST 15.8 2.8 13.3 % 13.4 % 31.3 % 0.83 543.8 20.1 0.27 % 0.00 % 16.3 -0.9547 -0.9327
MBPH.ST 20.3 3.0 -73.9 % -42.6 % 0.0 % 1.11 74.5 18.1 1.06 % 0.01 % 14.5 -2.0664 -1.8905
MSONb.ST 12.4 2.5 35.8 % 13.6 % 40.7 % 0.47 100.9 18.4 1.84 % 0.03 % 13.3 -0.8991 -0.8655
SKFb.ST 15.4 2.7 16.6 % 11.4 % 64.5 % 0.93 6378.3 22.6 0.08 % 0.00 % 19.8 1.2984 -0.5641
NOLAb.ST 13.6 2.6 -10.5 % 8.5 % 62.6 % 0.51 557.8 20.1 0.43 % 0.00 % 15.8 -0.7431 -0.6078















INDT.ST 21.8 3.1 6.7 % 10.5 % 40.3 % 1.10 2034.8 21.4 0.33 % 0.00 % 16.9 0.4325 0.0014
SAABb.ST 20.0 3.0 1.7 % 24.3 % 39.1 % 0.52 3065.1 21.8 0.14 % 0.00 % 17.4 0.6341 0.1377
GETIb.ST 28.9 3.4 20.7 % 40.8 % 48.0 % 0.94 4376.1 22.2 0.08 % 0.00 % 18.9 0.9237 -0.3697
HUFVa.ST 7.7 2.0 -50.8 % -33.1 % 18.4 % 0.83 2714.0 21.7 0.13 % 0.00 % 17.1 0.4992 0.1968
INVEb.ST 12.0 2.5 0.6 % -6.2 % 43.8 % 1.31 13993.4 23.4 0.06 % 0.00 % 19.5 2.0661 0.4178
AAK.ST 26.4 3.3 7.1 % 13.3 % 35.0 % 1.29 2709.6 21.7 0.21 % 0.00 % 16.9 0.5898 0.2992
INVEa.ST 11.9 2.5 0.6 % -6.2 % 43.8 % 1.28 9428.9 23.0 0.15 % 0.00 % 16.9 1.7646 1.5849
NETb.ST 52.1 4.0 31.0 % 19.7 % 0.0 % 0.60 1772.7 21.3 0.38 % 0.00 % 16.7 0.3567 -0.0138
VOLVb.ST 10.9 2.4 -12.1 % 10.5 % 40.5 % 1.30 15139.0 23.4 0.07 % 0.00 % 20.4 2.1588 -0.0418
TELIA.ST 21.3 3.1 59.9 % 4.7 % 164.9 % 0.69 18369.4 23.6 0.07 % 0.00 % 20.0 2.3456 0.3950
BEFsdb.ST 5.7 1.7 -15.2 % 64.5 % 0.0 % 1.03 86.1 18.3 1.02 % 0.01 % 14.4 -1.9622 -1.6719
HLDX.ST 18.3 2.9 13.9 % 19.0 % 46.8 % 1.38 332.6 19.6 0.41 % 0.00 % 16.7 -1.2917 -1.6518
IJ.ST 16.1 2.8 7.0 % 5.5 % 51.8 % 0.51 2162.1 21.5 0.16 % 0.00 % 17.7 0.3084 -0.4014
CORE.ST 2.9 1.1 -57.5 % -1.6 % 15.0 % 0.92 226.0 19.2 2.02 % 0.04 % 13.9 0.1019 -0.3891
MTGb.ST 29.2 3.4 -4.0 % 126.3 % 154.5 % 1.15 1546.0 21.2 0.07 % 0.00 % 18.2 -0.1224 -1.0112
ERICb.ST 15.2 2.7 -10.9 % 28.9 % 89.6 % 0.99 23957.8 23.9 0.08 % 0.00 % 20.4 2.6196 0.4242
SWEDa.ST 12.1 2.5 13.4 % -3.3 % 75.7 % 0.85 21247.7 23.8 0.07 % 0.00 % 20.1 2.4936 0.4752
BILL.ST 14.0 2.6 -3.8 % 9.1 % 48.6 % 1.30 2927.1 21.8 0.14 % 0.00 % 17.8 0.5911 -0.1418
ECEX.ST 25.5 3.2 -71.8 % 30.2 % 35.2 % 0.62 169.3 18.9 0.75 % 0.01 % 14.8 -1.5878 -1.2061
NIBEb.ST 24.3 3.2 4.3 % 11.9 % 29.9 % 1.02 2841.2 21.8 0.18 % 0.00 % 17.1 0.6004 0.2625
CVTEC.ST 30.4 3.4 21.7 % 42.1 % 35.3 % 0.16 193.4 19.1 1.52 % 0.02 % 14.0 -0.5978 -0.6259
HMb.ST 19.2 3.0 -6.1 % 13.7 % 77.2 % 1.00 43019.7 24.5 0.06 % 0.00 % 20.5 3.1827 0.9695
BILIa.ST 14.1 2.6 -11.5 % 1.3 % 52.2 % 1.28 986.9 20.7 0.40 % 0.00 % 16.4 -0.2061 -0.3825
JM.ST 14.4 2.7 26.0 % 10.7 % 57.7 % 1.21 1711.6 21.3 0.14 % 0.00 % 18.0 0.0533 -0.8273
WALLb.ST 8.1 2.1 -58.9 % -12.3 % 18.2 % 0.96 2183.1 21.5 0.19 % 0.00 % 16.6 0.3550 0.2932
PEABb.ST 23.0 3.1 93.3 % 3.7 % 96.1 % 1.22 1874.7 21.4 0.14 % 0.00 % 17.1 0.1388 -0.1733
ALFA.ST 14.1 2.6 -16.3 % -6.1 % 46.4 % 1.03 5989.6 22.5 0.09 % 0.00 % 19.1 1.2490 -0.2129
TIEN.ST 20.0 3.0 15.8 % 7.7 % 109.7 % 0.62 1760.5 21.3 1.17 % 0.01 % 14.3 1.2211 1.4260
STEa.ST 7.8 2.1 -28.4 % 5.5 % 32.3 % 1.54 593.8 20.2 1.67 % 0.03 % 13.3 0.6818 0.8908
OPUS.ST 22.5 3.1 -27.2 % 58.0 % 43.1 % 0.61 151.3 18.8 0.78 % 0.01 % 15.9 -1.6644 -1.9668
ICAA.ST 15.1 2.7 -9.4 % 1.6 % 54.9 % 0.51 5973.4 22.5 0.12 % 0.00 % 18.4 1.2758 0.2379
FABG.ST 7.1 2.0 -25.3 % -48.4 % 17.9 % 0.88 2385.2 21.6 0.14 % 0.00 % 17.3 0.3870 -0.0235
AXFO.ST 24.3 3.2 9.2 % 4.2 % 138.8 % 0.60 3367.9 21.9 0.14 % 0.00 % 17.2 0.7286 0.3324
ATCOa.ST 22.1 3.1 8.6 % 7.4 % 65.5 % 1.33 18202.6 23.6 0.07 % 0.00 % 20.1 2.3371 0.3367
CAST.ST 7.7 2.0 -38.0 % -15.0 % 27.9 % 0.63 3253.9 21.9 0.12 % 0.00 % 17.7 0.6680 0.0124
SAND.ST 29.4 3.4 62.8 % 12.5 % 89.7 % 1.22 10716.8 23.1 0.08 % 0.00 % 20.0 1.8172 -0.1636
SECUb.ST 18.9 2.9 5.5 % 8.6 % 52.4 % 1.08 4734.7 22.3 0.10 % 0.00 % 18.6 1.0233 -0.1385
KAHL.ST 25.7 3.2 90.5 % 12.6 % 51.4 % 0.60 264.1 19.4 0.48 % 0.00 % 15.9 -1.4452 -1.3980
TEL2b.ST 25.4 3.2 -29.3 % 77.2 % 189.4 % 0.81 3430.6 22.0 0.09 % 0.00 % 19.1 0.6918 -0.7477
LOOMb.ST 14.1 2.6 5.5 % 4.7 % 49.3 % 0.94 1793.9 21.3 0.26 % 0.00 % 17.2 0.2277 -0.2607
HMSN.ST 40.4 3.7 36.7 % 39.9 % 46.9 % 0.52 287.4 19.5 1.50 % 0.02 % 13.7 -0.2322 -0.0631
DORO.ST 21.5 3.1 50.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.59 163.5 18.9 0.48 % 0.00 % 15.3 -1.9189 -1.5388
ACANb.ST 12.1 2.5 16.1 % 4.0 % 94.4 % 0.61 188.9 19.1 0.94 % 0.01 % 14.5 -1.2652 -0.9582
DIOS.ST 8.3 2.1 -4.4 % 1.7 % 40.2 % 1.18 473.4 20.0 0.49 % 0.00 % 15.9 -0.8481 -0.8381
NOBI.ST 14.5 2.7 17.3 % 9.3 % 51.0 % 1.04 1635.6 21.2 0.41 % 0.00 % 16.8 0.3098 -0.1326
ATRLJb.ST 6.4 1.9 -67.1 % 26.3 % 17.0 % 0.65 1832.0 21.3 0.41 % 0.00 % 15.8 0.4160 0.5562
SWMA.ST 19.7 3.0 21.5 % -8.4 % 55.2 % 0.62 5524.0 22.4 0.07 % 0.00 % 19.1 1.1429 -0.2503
MEKO.ST 15.1 2.7 4.5 % 15.4 % 59.4 % 0.98 711.8 20.4 0.39 % 0.00 % 16.4 -0.5463 -0.7212
ASSAb.ST 24.3 3.2 -0.4 % 12.5 % 38.3 % 0.95 18747.1 23.7 0.07 % 0.00 % 19.5 2.3652 0.6820
ENEA.ST 14.1 2.6 1.2 % 7.0 % 0.0 % 1.81 149.3 18.8 1.15 % 0.01 % 13.7 -1.2714 -0.6807
WIHL.ST 5.7 1.7 -57.9 % 7.4 % 17.7 % 0.97 1380.3 21.0 0.31 % 0.00 % 16.7 0.0228 -0.2172
MQH.ST 9.5 2.2 -16.5 % 29.7 % 51.3 % 0.91 153.3 18.8 0.81 % 0.01 % 14.9 -1.6187 -1.4073
CLOEb.ST 21.0 3.0 3.4 % 23.8 % 37.1 % 0.54 800.6 20.5 0.65 % 0.00 % 16.6 -0.1432 -0.7125
GUNN.ST 18.9 2.9 48.3 % 18.7 % 46.0 % 1.17 346.8 19.7 0.56 % 0.00 % 15.0 -1.0759 -0.6073
BOL.ST 16.5 2.8 6.7 % 34.5 % 33.7 % 1.57 3949.8 22.1 0.09 % 0.00 % 19.6 0.8315 -0.8988
RAYb.ST 56.8 4.0 56.1 % 33.1 % 12.2 % 1.26 293.6 19.5 0.90 % 0.01 % 14.8 -0.8686 -0.6935
MEDCAP.ST 50.3 3.9 183.5 % 78.1 % 0.0 % 0.27 44.5 17.6 1.43 % 0.02 % 13.1 -2.1684 -1.5639
BETSb.ST 11.4 2.4 -2.9 % 8.1 % 0.0 % 0.74 1510.3 21.1 0.24 % 0.00 % 17.8 0.0378 -0.8076
PROB.ST 45.0 3.8 55.1 % 14.5 % 18.6 % 0.61 149.9 18.8 1.15 % 0.01 % 13.7 -1.2715 -0.6906
BIOT.ST 25.4 3.2 8.1 % 4.0 % 110.4 % 0.75 185.6 19.0 1.23 % 0.02 % 14.3 -0.9608 -0.8075
NMAN.ST 15.0 2.7 -4.1 % 10.0 % 38.4 % 0.83 265.1 19.4 1.97 % 0.04 % 13.4 0.2145 0.0491
BALDb.ST 7.2 2.0 -52.8 % -13.4 % 0.0 % 1.10 3461.3 22.0 0.30 % 0.00 % 17.2 0.9364 0.3878
CONSb.ST 15.7 2.8 77.0 % 20.5 % 35.6 % 0.52 104.4 18.5 1.38 % 0.02 % 13.7 -1.3728 -1.0709
KLED.ST 19.3 3.0 113.2 % -6.2 % 72.1 % 1.09 1107.3 20.8 0.43 % 0.00 % 16.7 -0.0612 -0.4436
RROS.ST 4.1 1.4 -65.6 % 7.7 % 34.2 % 1.38 106.7 18.5 1.19 % 0.01 % 14.7 -1.5586 -1.6174
MSONa.ST 19.1 2.9 6.6 % 8.6 % 40.7 % 0.99 1.6 14.3 9.02 % 0.81 % 10.2 2.8827 -3.1605
DGCO.ST 21.9 3.1 5.6 % 21.3 % 94.8 % 0.27 118.8 18.6 1.29 % 0.02 % 12.2 -1.3417 -0.0296
ABB.ST 21.3 3.1 4.5 % 22.6 % 0.0 % 0.78 38047.7 24.4 0.08 % 0.00 % 19.5 3.0853 1.4114


















REJLb.ST 21.6 3.1 90.8 % 26.4 % 50.5 % 0.55 121.2 18.6 1.11 % 0.01 % 13.3 -1.5287 -0.6784
EKTAb.ST 46.9 3.8 0.6 % 43.8 % 34.5 % 0.93 2478.5 21.6 0.10 % 0.00 % 18.9 0.3832 -0.9297
CLASb.ST 19.8 3.0 -9.6 % 19.6 % 72.5 % 0.71 970.8 20.7 0.37 % 0.00 % 16.2 -0.2660 -0.3116
LAMMb.ST 13.8 2.6 61.9 % 25.2 % 53.2 % 0.91 34.3 17.4 2.21 % 0.05 % 12.4 -1.5671 -1.3977
REZT.ST 18.8 2.9 17.2 % 38.8 % 35.4 % 1.34 617.7 20.2 0.64 % 0.00 % 15.7 -0.4149 -0.4756
FPIP.ST 47.5 3.9 70.5 % 44.1 % 57.8 % 0.31 47.8 17.7 1.15 % 0.01 % 13.6 -2.4053 -1.7724
BMAX.ST 14.7 2.7 -1.3 % 15.4 % 50.0 % 1.00 448.6 19.9 0.50 % 0.00 % 16.3 -0.8858 -1.1532
VITR.ST 53.9 4.0 15.4 % 30.7 % 28.5 % 0.69 801.8 20.5 0.66 % 0.00 % 15.7 -0.1296 -0.1692
IFSa.ST 43.1 3.8 75.2 % 23.2 % 38.0 % 0.29 40.3 17.5 9.20 % 0.85 % 14.1 6.3191 -2.2443
HUSQb.ST 18.6 2.9 11.2 % 19.0 % 50.3 % 0.91 2944.3 21.8 0.11 % 0.00 % 18.2 0.5562 -0.3851
CCORb.ST 4.2 1.4 -1.0 % -34.8 % 13.7 % 0.88 79.7 18.2 1.21 % 0.01 % 13.8 -1.8371 -1.3586
SAS.CO 9.8 2.3 131.7 % -15.7 % 0.0 % 0.89 799.1 20.5 0.81 % 0.01 % 15.8 0.0345 -0.2605
JYSK.CO 9.7 2.3 -5.3 % 30.5 % 20.1 % 0.38 3593.7 22.0 0.10 % 0.00 % 18.0 0.7508 -0.0660
PAALb.CO 8.1 2.1 -14.6 % 22.1 % 16.7 % 0.65 514.2 20.1 0.56 % 0.00 % 15.4 -0.6913 -0.4632
HHDC.CO 12.3 2.5 29.7 % 46.3 % 0.0 % 1.64 110.1 18.5 1.21 % 0.01 % 14.1 -1.5093 -1.2518
SYDB.CO 10.6 2.4 21.5 % 10.8 % 70.2 % 0.74 1818.6 21.3 0.14 % 0.00 % 17.4 0.1152 -0.3906
NDA.CO 8.3 2.1 -8.0 % 4.2 % 70.4 % 0.95 35418.4 24.3 0.11 % 0.00 % 18.1 3.0535 2.1730
SPNO.CO 7.5 2.0 -24.9 % 21.3 % 41.9 % 0.88 945.9 20.7 0.79 % 0.01 % 15.8 0.1734 -0.0867
DANSKE.CO 13.9 2.6 42.9 % 5.9 % 63.2 % 0.74 24183.8 23.9 0.10 % 0.00 % 19.6 2.6605 0.8920
MAERSKb.CO 34.4 3.5 110.9 % 42.9 % 118.9 % 1.07 11676.4 23.2 0.12 % 0.00 % 19.6 1.9539 0.2042
MTb.CO 14.3 2.7 53.3 % 5.1 % 44.2 % 0.51 141.1 18.8 1.71 % 0.03 % 13.2 -0.7035 -0.4521
NOVOb.CO 26.6 3.3 14.3 % 11.1 % 47.3 % 1.43 97841.0 25.3 0.06 % 0.00 % 20.5 4.0117 1.7556
ALMB.CO 14.8 2.7 18.2 % 2.5 % 99.0 % 1.27 1076.7 20.8 0.56 % 0.00 % 15.7 0.0508 0.1190
DFDS.CO 17.8 2.9 35.2 % 6.8 % 18.2 % 0.60 2108.8 21.5 0.36 % 0.00 % 16.4 0.4993 0.3289
SCHO.CO 13.6 2.6 1.0 % 10.7 % 36.5 % 0.59 1323.5 21.0 0.45 % 0.00 % 15.7 0.1363 0.3077
HOEJb.CO 12.9 2.6 17.1 % 35.1 % 0.0 % 0.63 52.9 17.8 1.75 % 0.03 % 12.7 -1.6428 -1.1516
VWS.CO 19.8 3.0 13.7 % 1.4 % 29.7 % 1.19 13348.4 23.3 0.09 % 0.00 % 20.0 2.0456 0.0887
DSV.CO 23.5 3.2 -30.8 % 61.1 % 14.2 % 0.20 7033.9 22.7 0.10 % 0.00 % 18.4 1.4160 0.3524
RILBA.CO 13.7 2.6 15.1 % 10.6 % 29.9 % 0.44 848.7 20.6 0.49 % 0.00 % 14.9 -0.2669 0.3444
ROCKb.CO 38.7 3.7 61.4 % 24.4 % 36.7 % 0.59 1536.7 21.2 0.20 % 0.00 % 16.9 0.0095 -0.2565
GN.CO 23.5 3.2 48.6 % 13.0 % 19.3 % 0.76 2694.4 21.7 0.12 % 0.00 % 18.3 0.4831 -0.5033
NZYMb.CO 35.2 3.6 12.3 % 7.7 % 38.4 % 1.20 10353.2 23.1 0.08 % 0.00 % 18.8 1.7899 0.5507
WDH.CO 24.5 3.2 17.9 % 11.6 % 0.0 % 0.42 4574.2 22.2 0.11 % 0.00 % 17.9 1.0058 0.2664
TOP.CO 13.5 2.6 -1.0 % 11.5 % 0.0 % 0.41 2370.2 21.6 0.11 % 0.00 % 17.6 0.3440 -0.2414
TRYG.CO 17.7 2.9 12.9 % 8.8 % 89.1 % 0.66 4847.8 22.3 0.12 % 0.00 % 17.9 1.0688 0.2862
SOLARb.CO 18.2 2.9 25.9 % 21.8 % 58.6 % 0.17 323.5 19.6 0.58 % 0.00 % 15.1 -1.1266 -0.7262
SIM.CO 34.3 3.5 -3.0 % 9.0 % 54.7 % 0.70 1771.4 21.3 0.38 % 0.00 % 16.5 0.3530 0.1015
FLS.CO 19.5 3.0 0.2 % 25.6 % 32.7 % 0.75 1696.9 21.3 0.09 % 0.00 % 18.5 -0.0116 -1.0941
PNDORA.CO 29.7 3.4 64.3 % 20.2 % 42.4 % 0.89 13884.6 23.4 0.10 % 0.00 % 19.6 2.0975 0.3622
OSSR.CO 31.4 3.4 13.8 % 13.3 % 15.2 % 0.40 1438.6 21.1 1.20 % 0.01 % 14.6 1.0536 1.0135
CHRH.CO 48.1 3.9 15.6 % 17.4 % 123.4 % 0.48 7369.9 22.7 0.09 % 0.00 % 18.3 1.4529 0.5135
IC.CO 18.5 2.9 28.1 % 13.8 % 43.0 % 0.36 467.7 20.0 0.72 % 0.01 % 14.6 -0.6028 -0.0992
ALKb.CO 33.6 3.5 -23.4 % 41.3 % 14.3 % 0.59 1280.8 21.0 0.38 % 0.00 % 16.0 0.0311 0.0645
RBREW.CO 23.1 3.1 9.4 % 7.5 % 55.7 % 0.38 2094.7 21.5 0.25 % 0.00 % 16.8 0.3802 0.1180
AMBUb.CO 90.5 4.5 58.0 % 27.4 % 31.0 % 0.14 1285.7 21.0 0.64 % 0.00 % 15.7 0.3188 0.2491
HARBb.CO 25.1 3.2 46.5 % 13.5 % 38.8 % 0.59 82.1 18.2 1.27 % 0.02 % 13.4 -1.7369 -1.1330
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